


PAHLEVI

Rough Sketch Plan

CASPIAN



MURDAB

KEY

- |                            |                     |                               |                         |
|----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 Field Bakery             | 6 Polish 'Q' Office | 10 Wharf                      | 14 Russian Petrol Tanks |
| 2 Tents Disinfecting Units | 7 Shah's Palace     | 11 British H.Q. (Grand Hotel) | 15 Mobile Bath Units    |
| 4 Polish H.Q.              | 8 Russian Barracks  | 12 F.S.D.                     | 16 Ordnance Dump        |
| 5 Governors House          | 9 Russian H.Q.      | 13 Polish F.S.D. & Ordnance   | 17 Fish Factory         |

COPY N° 3  
SECRET.

No. 2/1.  
British Base Evacuation Staff,  
Pahlevi. 3rd June, 1942.

To:

O.C.,  
Adv 5 Sub Area.

Subject:- REPORT ON POLISH EVACUATION FROM PAHLEVI.

1. I submit herewith a report on the evacuation of Poles from Pahlevi. The report embraces the period 25th March - 25th April 1942, i.e., from the date on which the first Poles landed at Pahlevi from Krasnovodsk to the date upon which the last main convoys were despatched to the south, leaving a comparatively small rear party of Poles and British in Pahlevi.
2. The evacuation fell naturally into two phases, the first from March 25th - 5th April when the peak of about 30,000 Poles in Pahlevi had been reached, the second from 6th April onwards when the problems encountered during the first phase had been overcome and the evacuation became a question of routine.
3. It is realised that this report is long but I have assumed that the circumstances were sufficiently exceptional to warrant a fairly full description of what occurred.

Sd/- A. ROSS,

Lieut-Colonel,  
Offr. 1/c British Base Evac. Staff.

REPORT ON EVACUATION OF POLES FROM PAHLEVI.25th March - 25th April 1942.CONTENTS.General Narrative - 1st Phase.

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FIRST PHASE.

1. D.A. and Q.M.G. and Evacuation Staff Arrive at Pahlevi.

The British and Polish Base Evacuation Staffs arrived in Pahlevi from TEHRAN on 25th March 1948. A detail of these staffs is shown under Appendix "A". The following also travelled to Pahlevi at the same time:-

Major-General C.R. Lane, M.C.,  
D.A. & Q.M.G., Tenth Army.

Brigadier R. Hewer, O.B.E., M.C.,  
D.Q.M.G. (Mv and Tn.) G.H.Q., M.E.F.

Lt.Colonel G.D. Jameson, R.A.,  
A.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., Tenth Army.

Lt.Colonel G.C. Luck, R.A.,  
A.Q.M.G. (Mov. & Tn.) G.H.Q., M.E.F.

2. Situation on Arrival.

(a) Change of Evacuation Scheme.

On 24th March the Soviet authorities in Tehran had, after professing continued ignorance of the evacuation, given their consent to the establishment of British and Polish Base Evacuation Staffs at Pahlevi and Kazvin. Previous to this three reconnaissance parties had visited these places and had made tentative arrangements to receive 2,500 Poles per week. One of these parties had returned to Tehran on 24th March leaving in Pahlevi Captain R. Schlee. Owing to the sudden change of plan on the part of the Soviet High Command, whereby it was announced that approximately 45,000, including women and children, were to be transported over a period of about eight days from Krasnovodsk to Pahlevi at the rate of 6,000 a day, the evacuation staffs were faced with a problem of the first magnitude. Further, though the first transport from Krasnovodsk was believed to be due on 27th March, the evacuation staff learnt on arrival at Pahlevi on 25th March that this transport was already lying off the harbour and was likely to land Poles the same evening. This in fact happened. According to information received from the Soviet port authorities no transports were expected on 26th March and as the first flight consisted of no more than 1,397 male personnel, it was presumed (wrongly as was subsequently found) that the threatened influx would not materialise owing to the inability of the Russians to provide trains in Trans-Caspia or sea transport.

(b) Accommodation Problem.

Nevertheless the question of accommodation in Pahlevi was one of great urgency. That previously hired was inadequate to house more than about 3,000 people and it became necessary to consider the possibility of placing evacuees in the open, either on Pahlevi Boulevard and on the beach on the West (Pahlevi) side of the port, or of having an overflow camp at Resht. The Polish Base Evacuation Staff pressed strongly for the latter. As strict instructions had been laid down about disinfection of all Poles on arrival owing to the typhus epidemic among Polish troops and civilians in Soviet Russia, General Lane was strongly opposed to having a camp at Resht though he later agreed that if this was absolutely necessary it could be arranged at the discretion of Lt.Colonel Ross. The Soviet military authorities shortly afterwards stated that there were already cases of typhus and small-pox in Resht and that they would not countenance this scheme.

(c) D.A. & Q.M.G. Visits Soviet Authorities.

General Lane visited the Soviet Consul General, the Soviet Garrison Commander and the Soviet Port Authorities during his visit. He left for Tehran on 27th March together with Brigadier Hower and Lt.Colonel Jameson. Lt.Colonel Luck remained behind to supervise transport.

3. Evacuation Begins.

(a) First Flight Arrives From Krasnovodak.

As stated above the first contingent of Poles arrived on 25th March and numbered 1,387 evacuees who were almost all sailors and airmen. They were accommodated in the buildings on the west side of the harbour hired by previous reconnaissance parties.

(b) First British Units Arrive.

One company 22 Fd Ambulance (Lt.Colonel M. Ata-Ullah, I.M.S.) arrived on 25th March. Headquarters of this Fd Amb. arrived on 26th March. The remaining company arrived on 4th April. 16 Fd Hygiene Section (Captain P.C. Koshy, I.M.S.) and a detachment of 145 Sup. Personnel Section (2/Lt. - now Captain R.W.H. Ellicome, R.I.A.S.G.) also arrived on 26th March.

(c) Local Arrangements.

On 23rd March a heavy snowfall had occurred in the Pahlevi-Resht area which added to the general difficulties. The snow had disappeared by 27th March. Meanwhile Captain Schlee had made arrangements for the provision under contract of soup and tea to the first evacuees and on 24th March the first U.K.C.C. lorries arrived in Pahlevi with ordnance stores and rations. Further stores arrived on 26th and 28th March by G.P. Tpt. detachments. An Ordnance Depot was formed with the assistance of Captain Ellicome and arrangements were made with the Polish staff for the issue of ordnance stores and rations. On 27th March an Ordnance detachment under a British N.C.O. arrived from R.C.D. Tehran, and Lieut. V.J.E. Wilkinson, I.A.O.C., arrived on 30th March.

4. Base Headquarters Established.

On 26th March a general reconnaissance was made of possible accommodation and camp sites. The British Base Evacuation Staff was established in the Grand (and only) Hotel on the Kazian side of the harbour. The Polish Base Evacuation Staff took offices on the Pahlevi side; in this area, which became known as No. 2 Camp, various Polish units and sub-units were installed including the Polish Ordnance Depot. Though it might appear illogical to have established the two headquarters on different sides of the harbour, this did not in fact give rise to any difficulties as distances were comparatively small.

5. Medical Arrangements.

(a) Disinfestation Commences.

Disinfestation commenced on the day following the arrival of 22 Field Ambulance. The general arrangements, which were most efficiently organised by Lt.Colonel Ata-Ullah, rapidly took the shape of four installations. One was improvised on Pahlevi Boulevard by 22 Fd Amb, where both the Iranian and Soviet authorities had each placed a disinfestator at our disposal; one was the 33 Mobile Bath Unit (Lieut. H.M. Bushell, A.M.P.C.), which arrived on 28th March and left on 4th April; one was organised in a local public bath in Pahlevi; and yet another was leased from Iranryba, the Soviet controlled /

controlled caviare and fish factory in Kazian. 37 Mobile Bath Unit (Captain A.R. Condor, M.C., 4/7 R.D.Gds., R.A.C.) arrived on 2nd April and remained for the period of this report; 31 Mobile Bath Unit (Lieut. E.S. Irwin, A.M.P.C.) was in Pahlevi from 20th March to 4th April. Though at first the number of arrivals was greater than the number of persons who could be disinfested, the latter was eventually increased to well over 4,000 daily and by about 1st April more evacuees were being bathed and disinfested than were arriving; this included not only disinfestation of bodies but also of clothes and hand baggage. In order to achieve this rate of disinfestation installations were frequently manned for 24 hours continuously.

(b) Hospital Arrangements.

A small hospital on the Kazian side was put at the disposal of the Evacuation Staff by the Iranians and was staffed by Poles with British assistance. A small building near the hospital was promised by the Russians on five successive days, which was urgently required for the purpose of segregation of infectious from non-infectious cases, was finally vacated by the Russian caretaker when the expedient was successfully adopted of placing six corpses outside the front door.

(c) Casualties.

The total number of patients admitted to hospital was 1,412, the highest number present on any given day being 203 On 2nd April. Evacuation to Tehran was carried out almost daily, the highest number evacuated being 131, also on 2nd April. The total number evacuated was about 1,320, the remainder being locally discharged. The number of deaths in hospital was 38 and on ships, on the way from ship to hospital, and in camp was 16. Between Pahlevi and Kazvin 17 evacuees died.

6. Local Purchase.

Captain Schlee, who undertook local purchase duties, was in Pahlevi on a preliminary local reconnaissance on 23rd March when he was informed that the first transport was on the way. He made immediate arrangements for feeding, cooking and sanitation for the first arrivals. Later when it was decided to establish camps on the open beaches, the question of providing shelter became urgent in view of the cold weather and frequent rain. Until numbers reached their peak of about 30,000 on 4th April time was the most important factor in all local purchases. With each new transport material and tools had to be provided and the new arrivals had to be organised and instructed in their use. There were also initial difficulties with local transport. The above factors involved certain departures from usual procedure in making local purchases which reached a considerable scale.

7. G.P.T. Units.

One section 55 G.P.T. Coy. (Lieut. C.G.M. Hardy, R.I.A.S.C.) arrived and camped in the show on 26th March. 36 G.P.T. Coy. (Major W.C. Williams, R.I.A.S.C.) arrived on 28th March and left on 31st March carrying evacuees. One platoon 50 Coy. R.A.S.C. arrived on 6th April and left on 13th April also carrying evacuees. All these units carried stores to Pahlevi. Both 36 G.P.T. Coy. and platoon 50 M.T. Coy. undertook a variety of duties during their stay, while Sec. 55 G.P.T. Coy. performed station transport duties throughout the period of the evacuation. These duties were frequently arduous. In many cases Indian drivers were on duty day and night on very bad roads and on other occasions they took vehicles out in relays in order to work 24 hours round the clock.

In addition to their normal duties the L.A.D. Squad of Sec. 35 G.P.T. Coy. undertook the maintenance and repair of over 100 military vehicles in Pahlevi as no Ordnance workshop facilities existed. In some instances the work included second and third-line repairs. Polish aviation mechanics were called upon to help and worked extremely well with the Indian personnel of the section.

8. Clearance From Pahlevi.

(a) Arrival of Movement Control Staff.

A Movement Control staff consisting of Captain G.R. Janvrin, Staff Captain (M) Tenth Army, and Captain D.W. Harris, R.T.O. Andimeshk, arrived on 28th and three clerks on 29th March. Captain Janvrin undertook the duties of Station Adjutant and accountant, while Captain Harris, in conjunction with Mr. H.E. Beecher, local representative of U.K.C.C., arranged for the marshalling of convoys and their despatch to the south. Transport personnel to assist this staff was provided by Polish headquarters.

(b) First Convoys Leave.

On 27th March the first contingent of 343 evacuees was despatched to Tehran by U.K.C.C. transport. On 28th March 5,152 evacuees arrived in one ship and 1,676, who had previously arrived and had been disinfested, were sent to Tehran. It is not proposed to give here in detail the further numbers of arrivals and departures which will be found in Appendices "B" and "C".

(c) Transport Problems.

Transport arrangements are dealt with under Appendix "D". It will suffice here to say that the despatch of anything up to 100 lorries and busses of all shapes and sizes, daily control of 100 Iranian and Armenian drivers and their mates, and embussing of Polish officers, soldiers, A.T.S., civilian men, women and children, which was until 16th April a daily routine, was a very considerable problem.

(d) Regular Departure of Convoys.

The regular despatch of convoys south at a steady rate to Tehran and at an equally steady, though not daily rate via the Hamadan route, which commenced on 31st March, continued without any considerable variation of programme and reflects great credit on Lt.Colonel Luck, Captain Harris, Mr. Beecher and their staffs. Lieut. R.L. Denton, 36 G.P.T. Coy., who was lent for a certain time to British Base Evacuation Staff, was also of great assistance. A small proportion of evacuees was moved by G.P. transport vehicles when these were ordered south. There was one serious accident between Pahlevi and Kazvin due to overtaking, after which Polish guards were posted beside each native driver.

9. Supplies.

(a) Initial Arrangements.

As the Polish authorities would not permit any personnel to proceed to Pahlevi before 25th March and as the situation was becoming urgent, Lt.Colonel Ross arranged with the U.K.C.C. in Tehran to carry certain supplies to Pahlevi before this date. These supplies arrived on 24th March and were unloaded and stored in godowns in Pahlevi without supervision or checking as no S. & T. representative was present.



Captain Ellicome arrived on 25th March, by which time refugees were on the point of arriving. Polish personnel had by this time drawn a quantity of supplies and this fact later caused some difficulty in estimating exactly the amount thus drawn. Meanwhile the L.P.O. had contracted locally for the provision of soup in addition to the normal ration scales as there had not been time to arrange cooking facilities. Bread was bought locally and 2,000 lbs. of Government flour was handed to local bakers to be baked into bread free of cost.

The daily potential production of ten local bakers was ascertained to guard against emergencies. On 26th March five Supply personnel arrived together with detachments of No. 15 Pd Bakery and No. 15 Pd Butchery, both of which performed admirable work.

(b) Initial Difficulties.

The large number of evacuees, the inadequacy of the P.S.D. staff and the limited stores available made conditions difficult. As evacuees arrived at all hours in thousands without due notice it was decided to issue one day's rations in advance to obviate the necessity of more than one ration drawing period, adjustments being made the following day for fresh arrivals and departures. To avoid confusion convoy rations were loaded on lorries direct from the P.S.D.

For the first few days the situation was unstable and remained so until the Polish camps became organised. To obviate the necessity of supplying tinned meat the Polish staff were requested to make cooking arrangements as soon as possible. This they did, first through contractors and later with their own personnel. By 7th April the Poles had taken over cooking arrangements in all camps and contractors ceased to be employed.

(c) Rations Sent to Krasnovodsk.

Instructions were received on 28th March to despatch 190,000 rations to Krasnovodsk. Action was immediately taken and the full number of rations of tinned meat and cheese was loaded that day on a Soviet ship together with small quantities of other commodities. On 29th March fresh instructions were received to despatch only 120,000 rations at a reduced scale. By 1st April the balance of other commodities was shipped over.

(d) Bread Supply Difficulties.

Supplies of bread from Tehran ceased without warning on 30th March and a contract was made with seven local bakers to provide daily 1,000 Kgs. of bread, each baker using Government flour. The first delivery from these bakers was not obtained until two days later and then not in the full quantity promised. This made it necessary to cut the bread ration to  $\frac{1}{2}$  lb. and  $\frac{1}{4}$  lb. per head for two days, after which the full scale of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lbs. was issued. This situation was explained to and readily accepted by the Polish Staff who were fully aware of the difficulties of the situation.

(e) Supplies to Ships.

Due to the roughness of the sea it was not possible on one or two occasions to land evacuees immediately and supplies were accordingly despatched to steamers at sea. On one occasion when a shipload of civilian refugees had been off Pahlevi for 36 hours in a rough sea at least four efforts were made before this could be accomplished.

(f) Local Market Affected.

With regard to fresh supplies the very large demands

undoubtedly /

undoubtedly had a big effect on the local market and the prices of meat, vegetables, etc., soared in some instances to as much as double. Beef was difficult to obtain but mutton was supplied in considerable quantities and fish on a number of occasions at same weight basis.

## 10. Ordnance.

### (a) Supplies and Delivery.

A bulk delivery of clothing and stores for Poles was despatched by U.K.C.C. lorries to Pahlevi on 22nd March and these were delivered direct to the Polish Staff for individual issue. A further quantity of boots, blankets and tents was despatched to Pahlevi on 28th March. A B.O.R. with a staff of eight sepoy's attached arrived in Pahlevi on 27th March and took over charge of the stores which were stacked in a dump on the Boulevard. The Ordnance officer arrived in Pahlevi on 30th March and took over charge of Ordnance stores which were moved to a site on the Kazian side on 5th April. Stores were brought up mainly by U.K.C.C. lorries but also by vehicles of 35 and 36 G.P.T. Coys. and of 50 M.T. Coy. R.A.S.C. The Polish Ordnance Depot at first installed on the Pahlevi side was later moved to godowns in Kazian.

### (b) Poles Arrive Well Equipped.

Supplies from the Middle East started to arrive on 7th April but were actually not required to any extent as contrary to expectations almost all the Polish military personnel arrived very fully equipped with British uniforms, boots, greatcoats, steel helmets, blankets and leather equipment.

### (c) Issue of Tents.

Six hundred and five tents Iranian type were issued to Polish camps together with 77 Army I.P., but as these could only accommodate about 8,000 persons it was found necessary to issue 30 covers waterproof 40' x 40'; the inclement weather rendered these a welcome addition.

### (d) Return of Issues to Store.

As the evacuation of Poles southwards continued camps were dismantled and tents and ordnance stores were collected from 19th April onwards and returned to the Ordnance dump. This included such items as had been issued to the Polish Staff for distribution but which had not in fact been distributed by them. At the end of the evacuation therefore the Poles were not in possession of any ordnance stores in Pahlevi.

### (e) Polish Clothing Sent to Krasnovodsk.

A quantity of Polish property consisting of under-clothing, Russian boots, blankets and old overcoats were disinfested and the under-clothing washed. Arrangements were made by the Poles to send these back to Krasnovodsk for the use of Poles in Soviet Russia.

## 11. Engineers.

### (a) Construction of Camps.

Captain Ide, R.E., arrived in Pahlevi on 27th March and took over immediate and efficient direction of Polish engineering personnel. This at first consisted of three companies, later reduced to one company. The construction of the camps was largely the work of these Sappers who worked very well, though owing to the rapid expansion there was occasionally

some difficulty in the supply of materials. The greatest area covered by the camps was about two square miles. A small amount of office furniture had to be purchased locally.

(b) Water Supply.

The water supply for disinfection, drinking and cooking purposes proved to be very good; wells were fairly numerous with a good yield, and it was also found that by excavating to a depth of only six feet water could be found in abundance on the foreshore even within 100 yards of the sea. It is perhaps worth noting that by sinking wells Pahlevi can furnish a water supply sufficient to cope with 100,000 refugees if necessary. Five pumps borrowed from the U.K.C.C. were repaired by a local firm of engineers and used by disinfection centres.

(c) Sanitation.

Supervision of latrines and incinerators was the duty of 16 Indian P4 Hygiene Section assisted by Polish sanitary squads. Owing to shortage of tools it was necessary to place orders for box seat latrines with a local firm; this met to a certain extent the heavy demand for sanitary requirements. Sanitary conditions in the camps were never up to British standards and at the beginning of the evacuation naturally left much to be desired, but owing to the continuous cool weather the danger of an epidemic was less than it might have been.

(d) Dismantling of Camps.

As the number of Poles in Pahlevi became less, camps were dismantled. This began on 18th April, all materials being temporarily stored and checked in the local R.O.D.

12. Signals.

(a) Communications Established.

A Signals detachment under 2/Lt. A.D. Latta arrived at Pahlevi at 15.30 hours 28th March. Communication was established on the BD-TRN-PLV group at 12.20 hours 29th March, but it was not until 18.20 hours 30th March that full clearing of traffic commenced.

On 2nd April Signals Tehran issued instructions to move over to the group TRN-PLV-KEN-HDN at 04.30 hours G.M.T. on 3rd April.

(b) Communication Breaks Down.

The Hewitt transmitter was unable to make contact on the new frequency and on 9th April Captain King, R.C.O.S., arrived in Pahlevi to make the desired contact. He was however unsuccessful and on 12th April Signals Tehran instructed Pahlevi to clear all traffic by civil circuit, at the same time instructing Signals No. 11 Set Detachment at Kazvin to move to Pahlevi to establish communication. Captain King left for Kazvin on 12th April. The Kazvin detachment arrived at 16.00 hours on 14th April. Communication was fully established at 06.30 hours on 17th April, Tehran having been heard each way spasmodically on 15th and 16th April. The delay in final establishment of communication on the No. 11 set was caused by valve trouble at Pahlevi. The Hewitt detachment was ordered to Kazvin and left on 18th April.

(c) Volume of Traffic.

The volume of traffic passed by the Hewitt transmitter

and /

and No. 11 set up to 25th April totalled 11,385 groups IN and 12,276 groups OUT, exclusive of Superintendent's messages. The traffic passed by civil circuit was 1,809 groups IN and 569 groups OUT, making a grand total traffic up to 25th April of 26,039 groups.

(d) Communication with Krasnovodsk.

On 30th March the Polish Staff requested the use of the Pahlevi wireless set for communicating with their headquarters at Krasnovodsk and a signal was sent to Tenth Army and Tehran informing them of the request. Headquarters Tenth Army granted the necessary permission but before communication was established this was withdrawn and the matter was allowed to drop. The Polish Staff however re-opened the subject on 21st April but no decision was arrived at by the time this report was concluded.

13. Organisation of Camps.

On 27th March General Szarecki, D.M.S. to the Polish Forces in Soviet Russia, and Colonel Okulicki, Chief of Staff to General Anders, arrived from Krasnovodsk together with 902 evacuees. A conference was held to discuss general policy and it was decided to form two camps, one on the beach on the west (Pahlevi) side of the port entrance and one on the beach on the east (Kazian) side. It was the intention to place all evacuees on arrival in the west (No. 1) camp, the so-called "Dirty" camp, and thence to march or (in the case of women and children) convey them to the disinfection centres. After disinfection they were to proceed to the so-called "Clean" (No. 3) camp. The embussing point for the convoys was fixed at the east end of the town on the Kazian side within a short distance of No. 3 camp. This plan, which came into operation on 28th March, worked satisfactorily as far as disinfection and disposal of Poles were concerned, but immediate difficulties arose in regard to maintenance of order. These are described below.

14. Conditions on Arrival of Transports.

(a) Rate and State of Arrivals.

Ships carrying evacuees from Krasnovodsk came in daily with no regularity and often without warning. Evacuees were landed at all times of the day and night, frequently by lighters from ships too big to enter the harbour. Civilian evacuees were usually in a state of destitution after landing. Everything that could be done to alleviate their situation was carried out; among other things transport to camps and hospitals was provided at the wharf, on which a medical tent was set up and hot tea was available day and night. There was however inevitably some suffering and owing to difficulties in administration not all the evacuees received food regularly for a few days after landing. The numbers gradually increased until the peak figure of over 30,000 at once in Pahlevi, including about 7,000 civilians, was reached on the night of 3rd/4th April.

(b) Difficulties Attendant Upon (a).

In dealing with such large numbers certain difficulties were inevitable. It was often for instance impossible by night to check accurately the numbers arriving. The issue of rations and the provision of hot tea and some sort of shelter in unconstructed camps were a considerable problem and the indifferent sanitary conditions might have had serious consequences. The inspection of the evacuees by the Russians at Krasnovodsk had not been properly carried out, with the result that typhus cases that should never have been embarked

arrived /

arrived among civilian crowds. A large amount of civilian baggage was brought, much of which was rubbish and had subsequently to be burnt. In one instance 72 tons of baggage arrived on one ship and among articles brought over were sewing machines, sacks of grain, dogs, fowls and masses of clothing in every state of delapidation. There was also at first a lack of organisation among the military for looking after civilians who were of course incapable of looking after themselves and among whom there were about 70 orphan children ranging from 6 to 12 years old. To deal with this a considerable amount of expense had to be incurred, details of which have been submitted separately.

15. Polish Administration Problems.

(a) Polish Staff.

The Polish Evacuation Staff, augmented by certain evacuated officers, was faced with a problem of the first magnitude. It would be idle to state that all went well from the very start for it will be clear that the administrative machine had to get going before it could function successfully. Nevertheless, considering the very great difficulties, it did so function in a remarkably short time. Lt. Colonel Machnowski, who had commanded the Polish Base Evacuation Staff since its inception in Tehran, was responsible for the appointment of a considerable number of officers to duties which they had to perform under conditions of stress. These included Ordnance and "Q" representatives, transport officers, commanders of the various camps and their assistants and liaison officers, not only with the British Headquarters, to which two officers were attached, but also to various British units and sub-units. To assess the work performed by Polish senior and junior personnel is no part of this report, but it may be stated that the evacuation could not have succeeded without the efforts of these officers and without the understanding between Polish and British staffs which was a feature of the ~~entire~~ whole operation.

(b) Local Difficulties.

Considerable difficulty was at first experienced in controlling both the Polish evacuees and the local Persian population. Polish soldiers and civilians were naturally anxious to provide themselves with articles which could be acquired in shops in the town after having been for so long deprived of such amenities in Soviet Russia. There was consequently considerable intermingling with the local population and, unfortunately, this was not confined to those Poles who had been disinfested. Among other things there was some traffic in old clothes which was highly dangerous. On the other hand it was found impossible to prevent Persian civilians of the lower classes from entering No. 1 camp in large numbers and mingling with the civilian evacuees. Though Polish headquarters realised the danger of this the Polish guards set on the camps were unarmed and therefore unable to exercise the necessary control. The Persian gendarmerie, of whom about 50 are normally stationed in Pahlevi, proved useless and even did a certain amount of trafficking on their own.

As a result of representations by the Persian Governor of Pahlevi, M. Ghulam Haseein Samiy, who complained that food in the town was getting scarce, pay ceased to be issued to Polish soldiers for a time. As the camps became organised and with the establishment of authority over civilian evacuees conditions improved though No. 1 camp, as stated below, had eventually to be abandoned.

(c) Poles Invite Soviet Aid.

In view of this situation, Colonel Okulicki called on the Soviet Consul General with a request for assistance from the Soviet military authorities. Among other things he asked for a Soviet guard on No. 1 camp to keep the local populace out or for arms to be given to the Polish cordons. To both of these requests a negative answer was given in polite terms. Later Lt. Colonel Ross made the same request about a Soviet guard which was also refused.

16. Abandonment of No. 1 Camp.

By 29th March it became manifest that No. 1 "Dirty" Camp on the west side of the harbour would have to be abandoned. Both the Soviet and Iranian authorities had pressed strongly for this. At first it was thought that disinfection would be held up if this was done, and this view was strongly supported by Lt. Colonel W.H. Crichton, C.I.E., A.D.H., Tenth Army, who visited Pahlevi from 28th to 31st March. It was, however, afterwards found to be practicable. Evacuees arriving on and after 2nd April were placed in a new "Dirty" camp, called No. 4 camp, on the beach on the Kazian side. The No. 3 "Clean" and No. 4 "Dirty" camp were divided by a barbed wire fence guarded by Polish cordons. The disinfection arrangements on the Pahlevi side were discontinued when the last evacuees in No. 1 camp had been disinfected on about 5th April. Polish Headquarters in No. 2 Camp on the Pahlevi side were eventually also transferred to tents on the Kazian side.

17. First Visit of General Zajac.

General Zajac arrived in Pahlevi on 31st March and inspected the camps and general organisation. He left for Tehran the following day. Lt. Colonel Nechnowski, who had been responsible for the beginning of the evacuation, returned with him to Tehran. Colonel M. Boleslawicz, C.C. 9th Polish Infantry Division, was appointed to command in Pahlevi, retaining the services of his Chief Staff Officer, Major Link.

18. Attitude of Soviet Military Authorities.

Attempts to keep in continuous touch with the local Soviet military commander were on the whole unsuccessful, but on 6th April the Soviet military authorities took action in the form of a protest to Lt. Colonel Ross about the behaviour of Polish troops. The protest was launched by Major Antonov, a Commissar who had arrived from Soviet Military H.Q. Tabriz, and included the following complaints:-

- (a) That Polish troops were flocking into the town and therefore spreading typhus;
- (b) That there was much trafficking in infested garments and possessions;
- (c) That Poles had brought over from Soviet Russia a quantity of Soviet currency;
- (d) That Polish troops had brought over a number of Soviet rifles;
- (e) That as a result of (c) and (d) above, the Soviet State was being damaged.

A small amount of currency and about five rifles were in fact brought over. The Poles were on their guard against this and as much currency as could be found and all the rifles had been surrendered in Pahlevi before this. Nevertheless there were elements of truth in all these complaints and a conference was arranged the evening of the same day which was attended by Colonel Boleslawicz, Major Link and Lt. Colonel Ross. Major Antonov produced in a very lucid fashion /

fashion the same complaints to which Colonel Boleslawicz gave appropriate answers. Rather surprisingly the Soviet authorities offered to arm Polish patrols and further said they were ready to assist in keeping order if the Poles could not do so themselves. The offer of arms was refused and Colonel Boleslawicz requested two day's grace to produce order in the town. This was agreed to. Polish patrols were strengthened and order did in fact improve and continued to do so as the number of Poles decreased.

19. Visit of Brigadier G.P. Crampton, M.C., D.C. 2 L. of C. Sub-Area.

Brigadier Crampton arrived from Tehran on 5th April and left on 7th April. By this time the re-arrangement of the camps mentioned above had been made and had lessened, to a certain extent, contact with the local populace though much trafficking still continued. After a joint inspection by General Boruta-Spiechowicz, who had just arrived from Krasnovodsk with the last transport, and Brigadier Crampton, both officers came to the joint conclusion that it was essential to move the civilians, especially women and children, to Tehran as soon as possible.

20. The End of the Evacuation from Krasnovodsk.

The last ship with 1,982 evacuees, including General Boruta-Spiechowicz, arrived appropriately enough in the early hours of Easter Sunday, 5th April, bringing the total number of evacuees up to 43,808, excluding those who died en route and three children born in hospital after the evacuation by sea was completed. The end of the evacuation was announced by a Soviet officer from Krasnovodsk, Captain Gamoilov, who stated that Stalin's orders to have the evacuation from Krasnovodsk completed by 2nd April had been carried out, and that the frontier was now closed. It was afterwards learnt that about 160 civilian refugees, who did not succeed in getting away by ship, had been sent back to Tashkent.

This ended what may be termed the first and more difficult phase of the evacuation.

SECOND PHASE.

21. The Second Visit of General Zajac.

On 6th April General Zajac made a second visit to Pahlevi and held a number of conferences at one of which Gen. Boruta-Spiechowicz gave his impressions on such questions as disinfection, discipline, bounds, training and other matters. General Zajac returned to Tehran on 7th April.

22. Improvement in Discipline and Administration.

Compared with the first phase, the second presented no particular problems. The Polish administrative system was by this time functioning normally. Discipline and morale improved among the troops. Concerts were given on the beach and regimental bands, which several units had brought out of Russia complete with instruments, gave performances.

With the arrival of Iranian tents and the issue of I.P. tents and large waterproof covers the camps assumed a semblance of orderliness, and it was possible to place all women and children and many of the troops under cover. Matting shelters had been erected which afforded at least some shelter from the wind and rain which was continuous for 48 hours on 8th and 9th April. The weather remained cool and the sickness rate comparatively low.

23. State of Civilians During Second Phase.

The state of the civilian refugees continued to cause anxiety. Their disinfection and segregation were very much more difficult to carry out than in the case of disciplined Polish troops, and this also applied to sanitation. There were few new clothes available for issue to women and children and the quantity sent from Tehran by the American Red Cross was very limited. The Polish Staff finally decided that they were justified in issuing a certain quantity of military stores such as canvas shoes, overcoats and blankets. Nevertheless many civilians re-assumed clothing after disinfection which could not in every case be checked. Difficulty was also experienced in disinfecting the aged and infirm, and in marshalling civilians for convoys. On the whole, however, the civilians remained cheerful under trying circumstances and at times under severe weather conditions.

24. Steady Rate of Evacuation by Convoy.

Evacuation of convoys had continued at a steady rate throughout the whole of the first phase. By the beginning of the second phase, i.e. by 6th April, approximately 19,000 persons had been evacuated. It merely remained therefore to keep the rate of evacuation up to programme standard, which was successfully done. The final convoy of civilians left on 17th April. On 18th April the U.K.C.C. commenced running convoys through to Sar-i-Pul-Zuhab and the last convoys to this staging post and to Tehran ran on 25th April.

25. Visit of Major-General G. de la P. Beresford, C.B., G.O.C. I. of C. Area.

Major-General Beresford visited Pahlevi on 11th April. During his visit he inspected the camps and in the evening was present at a bonfire concert organised by the 1st Polish Uhlan Regiment on the beach in No. 4 camp. Major-General Beresford left for Tehran on 12th April.

26. Visit of Colonel Boleslawicz and Lt.Colonel Ross to Tehran.

On 13th April M. Lopatto, an Attache in the Polish Embassy in Kuibishev, passed through Pahlevi en route for Tehran. He brought news that there was some possibility of a second evacuation. In order therefore to discuss this, and also to give a first-hand account of the situation, the G.S.C. British and Polish Base Evacuation Staffs visited Tehran on 14th April. At a conference on 15th April with General Zajac, at which Lt.Colonel G.R. Way, G.S.C.I, 26 B.M.M., was present, the question was discussed of leaving in Pahlevi a Polish staff sufficiently large to prepare and administer new camps. These camps would each hold 4,000 to 5,000 evacuees and would have their own headquarters, cookhouses, latrines, etc., thus facilitating control and administration; a transit camp for evacuees due to proceed the following day by convoy was also envisaged in this scheme. These smaller camps were to be on the sites of the existing large camps which would be dismantled. General Zajac agreed to this and it was eventually decided by Polish headquarters to leave 98 officers, 522 other ranks and 100 female personnel for this purpose. General Zajac raised the question of Russian agreement which, it was decided, was a matter for the British and Polish authorities in Tehran to discuss with the Soviet Ambassador.

Colonel Boleslawicz and Lt.Colonel Ross returned to Pahlevi on 15th April and a beginning was made of surveying new camp sites. This was discontinued, however, owing to the Soviet action described below in paragraph 27.



Soviet Attitude.

(a) Official Complaints.

On 17th April Captain Yevstratov, of Soviet Headquarters in Tabriz, came to the British Headquarters on his own initiative with a complaint that no Poles had been evacuated on the previous day and that the evacuation plan had therefore broken down. He also complained (inaccurately) that no troops had left on 10th April. He was evidently speaking to order (probably from Tabriz) and adopted a most critical attitude. It appeared from this unpleasant conversation as though the Soviet military authorities had decided to make an effort to speed up the evacuation without proper understanding of the factors concerned and had perhaps become nervous of the presence of British troops on the Caspian.

The plan of evacuation was explained to him and he was assured that the last contingent would leave on 25th April, excluding the rear party. In view of the Soviet attitude it was decided not to press for a large Polish staff to remain to administer the proposed camps. This personnel was finally fixed at 21 officers, 356 other ranks, 1 lady typist, and 9 nursing sisters.

(b) Liaison.

On 21st April Major Kireyev, Liaison Officer with the Polish Headquarter Staff in Soviet Russia, arrived by air and announced himself as the Liaison Officer with the British and Polish Base Evacuation Staffs. This officer's pleasant manner, comparative seniority and acquaintance with Polish methods rendered dealings with the Soviet military authorities easier towards the end of the evacuation. It is to be regretted that he did not arrive earlier.

28. Last Convoys Leave.

The last convoys left after a severe thunderstorm on 25th April, taking with them a few civilians who had emerged from unknown retreats at the last minute. For the first and last time Soviet officers came to view their departure. The last lorry to drive off carried a military band which, though it had forgotten its instrument cases, left the shores of the Caspian playing with abandon that well-known ditty "The Lambeth Walk".

A P P E N D I X " A "  
BRITISH BASE EVACUATION STAFF, PAHLEVI.

<u>HEADQUARTERS.</u>	<u>Corps or Regt.</u>	<u>Postings.</u>	<u>Appointment.</u>	<u>B.B.E.S. Duties.</u>
Lt-Col. A. Ross.	H.L.I.	GHQ. M.E.F.	G.I.	C.O.
" G.C. Luck.	R.A.	10th Army.	AQMG. (Mov. & Tn).	O.C. Movement Control.
Capt. C.R. Janvrin.	R. Berks.	M.C. Andimeshk.	S.C.(M).	Adjutant.
" D.W. Harris.	7th Rajputs.	26 B.M.M.	R.T.O.	R.T.O.
Maj. C.A.H. Blake. *	R.U.R.	26 B.M.M.	G.II.	L.O. Polish HQ.
Capt. R. Schlee.	General List.	26 B.M.M.	L.O.	L.P.O.
" J.B. Edwardes.	6th Raj. Rif.	GHQ. MEF.	L.O.	L.O.
" M. Chaplin. *	Suffolk Regt.	GHQ. MEF.	Spec. Empl.	L.O.
Lieut. L. Connop.	Q.O.R.W.K.R.	GHQ. MEF.	Spec. Empl.	L.O. Disinfestation duties.
<u>ENGINEERS.</u>				
Capt. A.E. Ide.	R.E.	10th Army.	S.O.R.E.	Station Engineer.
<u>ORDNANCE.</u>				
Lieut. V.J.E. Wilkinson. *	I.A.O.C.	R.O.D., Tehran.	O.O.	O.C. R.O.D.
" T.T. Mirchandani. *	I.A.O.C.	Attd A.O.D., Abwaz.	O.O.	O.O.
<u>SUPPLIES.</u>				
Capt. E.W.H. Ellcome.	R.I.A.S.C.	145 S.P.S.	O.C.	O.C. F.S.D.
<u>TRANSPORT.</u>				
Lieut. C.C.M. Hardy.	R.I.A.S.C.	35 G.P. Tpt. Coy.	Sec. Offr.	S.T.O.
Lieut. R.L. Denton. *	R.I.A.S.C.	36 G.P. Tpt. Coy.	Sec. Offr.	S.T.O.
2/Lieut. K. Rattan.	R.I.A.S.C.	22 Fd Amb.	M.T.O.	M.T.O.
<u>SIGNALS.</u>				
2/Lieut. A.D. Latto.	3/11 Sikhs.	10th Army.	Cipher Offr.	Cipher Offr. & O. i/c Sigs. Det.

B.B.E.S. Duties.

Appointment.

Corps or Regt.      Posting.

MEDICAL.

Lt-Col. M. Ata-Ullah.	I.M.S.	22 Fd Amb.	O.C.	S.M.O.
Maj. J.V.L. Farquhar.	R.A.M.C.	" " "	M.O.	M.O.
Capt. F. Elliot.	R.A.M.C.	" " "	"	"
" S.A.C. Miller.	R.A.M.C.	" " "	"	"
" V. Raghavchar.	I.M.S.	" " "	"	"
Lieut. B. Mahadevan.	I.M.S.	" " "	"	"
" M. Singh Roy.	I.M.S.	" " "	"	"
" A. Haq.	I.M.S.	" " "	"	"
" A.J. Fullthorpe.	R.A.M.C.	" " "	"	"
Major J. Gordon.*	R.A.M.C.	26 B.M.M.	L.O.	O.i/c Hospital.
Major D.A. Lyon.*	R.A.M.C.	" " "	L.O.	O.i/c Hygiene
Capt. J. Bauer.*	R.A.M.C.	" " "	L.O.	Med: Coordinating Office
Capt. P.C. Koshy.*	R.A.M.C.	" " "	O.C.	O.C., 16 Fd Hyg Sec.
Capt. A.R. Condon, M.C.	I.M.S.	16 Fd Hyg Sec	O.C.	O.C., 37 M.B.U.
Lieut. R.M. Bushell.*	4/7 R.D.	Gds:R.A.C	O.C.	O.C., 33 M.B.U.
Lieut. H.S. Irwin.*	A.M.P.C.	33 M.B.U.	O.C.	O.C., 31 M.B.U.
	A.M.P.C.	31 M.B.U.	O.C.	

\* Left Pahlevi before end of Evacuation.

POLISH LIAISON OFFICERS.

- Capt. S. Strumph Wojtkiewicz.
- Capt. S.R. Rosada.

Note:-

Major G. Wynne-Rushton, 26 B.M.M., who had been on the staff of Polevac since the beginning of the evacuation, and who was responsible for the 3 first reconnaissances on the Caspian, left for Kazvin after 2 days in Pahlevi and was later transferred elsewhere.

BSM.

## POLISH EVACUATION - TAILS OF ARRIVALS AT PAHLEVI.

APPENDIX "B".

Ship No.	Date.	Formation.	Offrs.	O.Rs.	ATS.	Total.	Scouts.	Adults.	Children.	Total.	Grand Total.	Ship Total.	Ship Running Total.
1.	25/3.	Airmen & Sailors.	53.	1309	10	1372	-	15	-	15	1387	1387	1387
2.	27/3	Inf. Various.	87	812	-	899	-	3	-	3	902	902	2289
3.	28/3	9 Div. Hy. Arty.	12	166	-	178	-	4	-	4	182	182	
		Lt. . .	17	259	4	280	-	-	-	-	280	280	
		25 Inf. Regt.	29	676	-	705	-	14	-	14	719	719	
		9 Div. Sigs	8	92	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	100	
		R.E. Coy.	7	277	-	284	-	-	-	-	284	284	
		M.T. Coy.	5	261	-	266	-	-	-	-	266	266	
		6 Div 16 Inf Regt.	1	103	-	104	-	-	-	-	104	104	
		17 . . .	5	209	-	214	-	-	-	-	214	214	
		18 . . .	5	429	-	434	-	-	-	-	434	434	
		A.T.S. . .	-	-	85	85	-	-	-	-	85	85	
		A.Tk. Coy.	-	126	-	126	-	-	-	-	126	126	
		A.T.S. . .	-	-	270	270	-	-	-	-	270	270	
		Cadets . .	12	281	-	293	-	-	-	-	293	293	
		Scouts . .	9	-	-	9	522	-	-	522	531	531	
		Nurses . .	-	-	30	30	-	-	-	-	30	30	
		Scouts . .	-	-	-	-	250	-	-	250	250	250	
		Orphans . .	-	-	-	-	894	-	-	894	894	894	
4	29/3	Inf Regt.	51	422	-	473	-	-	70	70	5132	5132	7421
5.	30/3	9 Div 26 Inf Regt.	42	1274	26	1342	-	1114	-	1114	1587	1587	9008
		A.Tk. . .	4	79	-	83	-	-	-	-	83	83	
		Lt. Arty. .	3	103	-	106	-	-	-	-	106	106	
		F.S. Coy. .	2	49	-	51	-	-	-	-	51	51	
		R.E. . .	7	75	-	82	-	-	-	-	82	82	
		Inf. Various.	-	264	-	264	-	-	-	-	264	264	
		Rece Bn. . .	9	148	-	157	-	-	-	-	157	157	
		Provost. . .	2	26	-	28	-	-	-	-	28	28	
		Hyg. Coy. .	3	82	2	87	-	-	-	-	87	87	
		Sigs . . .	3	72	-	75	-	-	-	-	75	75	
		A.T.S. . .	1	60	-	61	-	-	-	-	61	61	
		H.Q. . .	-	-	68	68	-	-	-	-	68	68	
		Mob W/S. . .	55	80	-	135	-	-	-	-	135	135	
		A.S.C. . .	1	19	-	20	-	-	-	-	20	20	
		Scouts . .	1	24	-	25	-	-	-	-	25	25	
		Married Families.	-	-	-	-	49	10	-	59	59	59	
		Army Base Units.	37	830	-	867	-	213	-	213	213	213	
		Carried Forward	471	8607	495	9573	1715	1511	70	3296	12869	3861	12869.

Ship No.	Date	Formation.	Offrs.	O. Rs.	ATS.	Total.	Scouts.	Adults.	Children.	Total.	Grand Total.	Ship Total.	Ship Running Total.
6	30/3	Total B/F.	471	8607	495	9573	1715	1511	70	3296	12869		12869.
	31/3	8 Div 19 Inf Regt.	128	1718	29	1875	-	330	-	330	2205		
	..	Army Base Unit.	118	789	40	947	-	50	167	217	1154	3945	16814.
7.	1/4	10 Div Inf Various.	25	551	-	576	-	-	-	-	576	1606	18420.
8	..	7 Div Army Base Unit.	3	780	-	783	120	613	90	823	1294		
	..	10 Div 27 Inf Regt.	60	1234	-	1294	-	-	-	-	464		
	..	8 .. 22 ..	5	459	-	464	-	-	-	-	474		
	..	8 .. Cadets.	20	445	-	474	-	-	-	-	1929	4161	22581.
9	..	21 Inf Regt.	130	1661	138	1929	-	-	-	-	1102		
	..	Lt. Arty.	34	533	-	573	-	139	-	129	192		
	..	A.A. ..	3	189	-	192	-	-	-	-	410		
	..	R.E. Bn.	11	399	-	410	-	-	-	-	55		
	..	Nurses.	-	-	55	55	-	-	-	-	15		
	..	Provost.	1	14	-	15	-	-	-	-	10		
	..	Hq.	3	7	-	10	-	-	-	-	75		
	..	22 Inf Regt.	46	1215	-	1261	-	-	-	-	743		
	..	24 Inf Regt.	24	719	-	743	-	-	-	-	30		
	..	Provost.	1	29	-	30	-	-	-	-	11		
	..	Mob W/S.	-	11	-	11	-	-	-	-	9		
	..	Hyg. Service.	1	2	6	9	-	-	-	-	14		
	..	Sigs.	1	13	-	14	-	-	-	-	56		
	..	7/8 20 & 24 Inf Regt.	14	36	-	53	-	3	-	3	83		
10	..	8 Div Inf Various.	5	78	-	83	-	-	-	-	637	4066	26647.
	..	Recece Bn.	17	620	-	637	-	-	-	-	302		
	..	Sigs	5	297	-	302	-	-	-	-	214		
	..	Medical.	3	146	65	214	-	-	-	-	308		
	..	Hq & Provost.	56	252	-	308	-	-	-	-	5		
	..	Various.	2	3	-	5	-	-	-	-	95		
	..	Lt & A.A. Arty.	47	530	19	596	-	86	10	95	250	2408	29055.
11	2/4	Army Base Unit.	4	69	28	101	18	107	23	149	499		
	..	7 Div R.E.	9	490	-	499	-	-	-	-	281		
	..	H.Q.	4	82	-	86	-	125	70	195	91		
	..	Airmen & Sailors.	-	14	77	91	-	-	-	-	379	1250	30305.
	..	10 Div Scouts.	2	10	-	12	26	261	80	367	866	866	31171.
12	3/4	Hq. Staff.	46	71	123	240	-	527	99	626	1654		
13	..	10 Div 28 Inf Regt.	85	1572	-	1657	-	7	-	7	904		
	..	A.Tk. Reserve.	32	872	-	904	-	-	-	-	317		
	..	School.	84	221	-	305	-	12	-	12	772	2557	34325.
	..	7 Div 22 & 23 Inf & 7 Lt Arty.	5	767	-	772	-	-	-	-	6325	34325.	
	..	Carried Forward	1514	25914	1075	28503	1390	3936.	609	6325	34325.		

Ship No.	Date.	Formation.	Ofprs.	O.Rs.	ATS.	Total.	Scouts.	Adults.	Children.	Total.	Grand Total.	Ship Total.	Ship Running Total.
14	3/4	Total B/F.	1514.	25914.	1075	28503	1880	3836	603	6325	34828	-	34828.
15	4/4	Families.	-	-	-	-	-	1833	1065	2898	2898	2898	37726.
16	..	Inf Various.	3	24	2	29	-	1421	750	2171	2200	2200	39926.
17	..	Recruits.	9	670	-	679	-	230	230	570	1249.	-	-
..	..	Civilians.	-	-	-	-	-	286	365	651	651	1900	41825.
..	5/4	5 Div Inf.	34	449	74	557	-	-	-	-	557.	-	-
..	..	6 ..	16	150	2	168	-	3	1	4	172.	-	-
..	..	7 ..	19	1044	3	1066	-	-	-	-	1066.	-	-
..	..	10 ..	-	10	-	10	-	-	-	-	10.	-	-
..	..	Sigs Coy.	8	155	3	177	-	-	-	-	177.	1982.	43808.
FINAL TOTAL.			1603	28427	1159	31189	1880.	7669.	3070.	12619.	43808.		

POLISH EVACUATION - DETAILS OF DEPARTURES FROM PAHLEVI.

Date.	Offrs.	Men.	Women.	Children.	Destination.	Total.	Running Total.
27 Mar. 42.	18	325	-	-	Tehran.	343	343.
28 .. ..	85	1588	3	-	..	1676	2019.
29 .. ..	-	2	9	174	..	185	2204.
30 .. ..	7	371	274	277	..	929	3133.
31 .. ..	26	810	668	414	..	1921	5054.
31 .. ..	8	292	3	-	Hamadan.	303	5357.
1 Apr. 42.	8	327	605	771	Tehran.	1711	7068.
1 .. ..	35	662	6	-	Hamadan.	703	7771.
2 .. ..	114	1746	158	163	Tehran.	2181	9952.
3 .. ..	21	716	877	570	Tehran.	2184	12136.
4 .. ..	129	1781	210	60	..	2180	14316.
5 .. ..	42	888	479	258	..	1661	15977.
6 .. ..	10	293	438	294	..	1035	
6 .. ..	84	1830	41	-	Hamadan.	1955	18967.
7 .. ..	30	435	899	816	Tehran.	2180	21147.
8 .. ..	71	703	338	12	..	1124	
8 .. ..	30	1880	49	-	Hamadan.	2009	24280.
Total Carried Forward 771						24280.	

2.....

Date.	Organised Units.		ATS.	Army Boys.	Civilians.			Destin- ation.	Total.	Running Total.
	Offrs.	O.Rs.			Unorganised Units. Offrs.	O.Rs.	Males.			
Up to 8 Apr. incl.										
B/F & Analysed as:-	( 564	8950	373	1929	1035	4085	1874	Tehran.	19310.	19310.
9 April 42.	128	1857	21	-	-	-	86	Hamadan.	4970.	24280.
10 ..	37	962	2	-	-	5	4	Tehran.	2092.	26372.
10 ..	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	..	37.	
11 ..	55	628	34	-	305	741	713	Hamadan.	999.	27408.
12 ..	73	1524	27	-	339	652	445	Tehran.	2140.	29548.
13 ..	44	1391	1	-	-	1	-	..	2146.	31694.
14 ..	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	..	22.	
14 ..	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	Hamadan.	1597.	33313.
15 ..	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	Tehran.	1435.	
16 ..	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	..	24.	34772.
17 ..	104	464	2	-	-	2	-	..	64.	34836.
18 ..	59	1939	10	-	104	227	105	..	10.	34846.
18 ..	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	..	1006.	35852.
19 ..	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	S.P.Z.	1998.	
19 ..	-	-	104	-	-	-	8	Tehran.	17.	37867.
20 ..	37	1969	2	-	5	4	-	..	132.	
20 ..	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	S.P.Z.	33.	38032.
21 ..	36	962	1	-	-	2	1	Tehran.	2006.	
22 ..	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	..	26.	40064.
22 ..	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	Tehran.	26.	40090.
23 ..	-	-	15	-	3	1	-	S.P.Z.	598.	
24 ..	73	430	13	-	-	5	1	Tehran.	19.	41107.
25 ..	65	898	18	-	-	4	1	..	19.	41126.
25 ..	21	356	26	-	-	6	1	..	25.	41151.
25 ..	65	898	1	-	-	6	-	..	536.	41687.
25 ..	21	356	1	-	-	6	-	..	21.	41708.
Rear Party at Pahlevi	968	13720	10	-	-	-	-	SPZ.	963.	42671.
Tehran.	317	7150	39	1929	1792	5747	3247	..	387.	43058.
Hamadan.	197	5768	1099	-	-	-	-	..	29140.	
SPZ.	21	356	99	-	-	-	-	..	7566.	
Rear Party.	21	356	10	-	-	-	-	..	5965.	
GRAND TOTAL.	1503	26994	1208	1929	1792.	5747	3247		387.	43058.



AMENDMENT NO.1 to APPX "C"

	Organised Units.		Unorganised Units.		A.T.S.	Army boys	Civilians		Desti	Total	Remaining Total
	Offrs.	ORs.	Offrs.	ORs.			Males	Women			
Grand total B.F.	1503	26994	39	599	1208	1929	1792	5747	3247	43058	43058
In hospital at PLV on 25/4.	-	-	-	17	1	-	-	2	-	20	
Deaths in PLV.	-	-	1	35	-	-	-	7	11	54	
By two buses at own expense on 27/3.	-	-	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	
Left on various dates for liaison duties.	-	-	3	23	-	-	-	-	-	26	
Left direct from camps instead of embussing pt.	-	-	21	335	-	-	-	-	-	356	
Small parties of late arrivals at embussing pts, despatched after departure of convoys on various dates.	-	-	-	260	-	-	-	-	-	260	750
	963	13720	97	1217	1089	1929	1792	5747	3247	29316	43808
TRN.	317	7150	-	-	99	-	-	-	-	7566	
HDN.	197	5768	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5965	
SPZ.	21	356	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	387	
Rear Party	-	-	-	17	1	-	-	2	-	20	
In hospital at PLV 25/4	-	-	1	35	-	-	-	7	13	54	
Deaths in PLV.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Grand total	1503	26994	98	1269	1209	1929	1792	5755	3258	43808	

MOVEMENT CONTROL REPORT.1. POLICY.

Clearance by M.T. to :-

- (a) TEHRAN, mainly for civilians.
- (B) HAMADAN, for onward lift by G.P.T. Coys.

Normal daily dispatch was 100 vehicles lifting 2,000 personnel

This daily rate was not maintained as Tehran could not always accept, there were delays in obtaining destinations for Units, and onward clearance from Hamadan was limited to 5,000 per week. There was no shortage of transport at Pahlevi.

Details are shown in Appendix "C"

MEANS OF TRANSPORT.

Except for one trip each by 36 G.P. Coy., and one Platoon 50 G.P.T. Coy., returning to Tenth Army after delivery of stores, all personnel were lifted by U.K.C.C. transport. This consisted of a certain number of buses used for women, children and sitting sick, and lorries fitted locally with benches.

The lorries were of every shape and size, and varied considerably in road worthiness.

2. STAFF.

British. Lt-Col G.C. Luck, A.Q.M.G.(Mov & Tn) G.H.Q., M.E.F.  
 Captain C.R. Janvrin, S.C.(Mov), H.Q. Tenth Army.  
 Captain D.W. Harris, R.T.O., Andimeshk.  
 Captain J.B. Edwardes, 26 B.M.M.  
 Sgt: L.C. Ebdon, Movement Control, Iraq.  
 Sgt: E. McCaffry, Movement Control, Iraq.

In the event of future evacuation, it is suggested an experienced British E.S.O. with one or two N.C.O. assistants would be of great assistance for organisation of disembarkations.

Polish. Varied daily both in numbers and ability owing to constant changes.

20 guides, loaders, etc., 20 luggage porters were required. For every convoy, one officer or N.C.O. was detailed to travel beside the driver of each vehicle, with orders to control speed and halts.

3. FACTORS AFFECTING CLEARANCE.

- (a) Control of Persian drivers. U.K.C.C. staff at Pahlevi was inadequate in the early stages; only one convoy leader was available for each convoy, but at least two, in separate cars, should have been available to control the unreliable Persian drivers.
- (b) First Stage. Pahlevi to first stage at Kazvin is 140 miles, over a mountain road. Convoys had to leave by 1000 hrs to reach Kazvin before dark. But owing to breakdowns or stops for refreshments, see (a) above, even with the last lorry leaving Pahlevi by 0800 hours many did not arrive at Kazvin until after dark.
- (c) Civilians. The loading of women and children was difficult to control, particularly as many carried unwieldy bundles. Even with special ladders many lorries were difficult to

get into

4. ARRANGEMENTS MADE.

- (a) Lorries were formed up, the evening before departure, in rows of ten and a list made of vehicle capacities. A Polish guard was then mounted to prevent lorries moving without orders.
- (b) On each side of the vehicle Park a lane was formed with ropes. As personnel arrived from the camps they were formed up in threes in these lanes, and then led forward in parties according to the size and capacity of individual vehicles.
- (c) Heavy luggage was collected in dumps under guard for seven days segregation, and then dispatched in bulk. Even so civilians carried large amounts of baggage, some of which had probably not been disinfested, owing to lack of control by Polish Staff.
- (d) Dry rations for the first day's journey were issued under Polish arrangements. Rations for the rest of the journey, also two days in reserve in the case of Hamadan convoys, were loaded in the F.S.D. the day before departure and handed over to a Polish party to guard and issue en route.

5. TRANSPORT FOR STATION DUTIES.

One Sec 35 G.P.T. Coy., which arrived with stores, was retained for station duties. Besides normal work involved in the administration of the camps, a large number of civilians could not walk and had to be transported to and from baths, etc.

Use was also made of U.K.C.C. lorries, and at the peak period 20 were working daily; but they were expensive and most unreliable, frequently disappearing during the night. As soon as the amount of work permitted they were dispensed with.

POLISH EVACUATION

REPORT BY S.M.O. PLV.

1. INITIAL SITUATION.
2. DISINFESTATION.
  - (a) Process and equipment.
  - (b) Installations.
    - i. Persian Hammam.
    - ii. Tent Unit.
    - iii Fish Factory.
    - iv. Mobile Bath Units.
  - (c) General remarks.
  - (d) Polish opposition and disorganization.
3. Hospital Arrangements in Pahlevi.
  - (a) Previous information.
  - (b) Actual situation.
  - (c) Hospital administration.
  - (d) Medical inspection rooms.
  - (e) Statistics.
4. Sanitation.
  - (a) General difficulties.
  - (b) Absence of sanitary discipline.
  - (c) Latrine arrangements.
  - (d) Water.
5. Evacuation of the sick to Tehran.
  - (a) Ambulance cars available.
  - (b) Maintenance difficulties.
6. Health of own troops.
7. Liaison.
8. Diary.