

P R E F A C E .

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The thanks of the British Base Evacuation Staff are due to Lieut. Col. Stanislas Lechner and to all the Polish Staff who collaborated in the 2nd. Evacuation. It is not possible to remark on them individually as such a list would include the name of almost every officer on the Polish Staff in Pahlevi. Nevertheless, mention should be made of the exceptional services of Major Jan Wilcynski, Q.M. of the Polish Forces, who, during the greater part of the Evacuation, acted as Chief Liaison Officer with the British Base Evacuation Staff; of M. Josef Antoszkiewicz, Chief Civilian Delegate in Pahlevi during the Evacuation; and of Lieut. Zygmund Rosada, Polish Air Force, who acted as personal Liaison Officer to the British Commander. To the close collaboration of these officers with the British Base Evacuation Staff the successful outcome of the evacuation is largely due.

Throughout the whole evacuation, Lieut. Col. Lechner and his staff worked indefatigably and, on the whole, the Polish administrative machinery functioned extremely well. If it was found that in certain directions there was a lack of organisation, it must be remembered that, with few exceptions, the Poles had been 2½ years in the Soviet Union, that they were both mentally and physically tired, and that the conditions under which they found themselves in Pahlevi were totally different from any under which they had previously lived.

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PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE.

PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS.

1. SECOND EVACUATION OFFICIALLY NOTIFIED.

After considerable doubt as to whether the second Polish evacuation would take place, official information reached Pahlevi on 10 July, 1942, that transports bringing Poles from Krasnovodsk would arrive within a short but unspecified time. The first Poles actually disembarked in Pahlevi on 10 August 1942.

2. BASE EVACUATION STAFFS.

(a) Skeleton Evacuation Staffs, both British and Polish, had stayed in Pahlevi after the first evacuation, the Commanding Officers being respectively Captain R. SCHLEE, 26 B.M.M., and Lt. Col. HENRYK BOROWIK. They included a Company of 22 Ind. Fd. Amb., but no transport. The rest of the Polish Staff had moved to Tehran after the first evacuation where, under the command of Colonel Antoni SZYMANSKI, it remained in readiness to return to Pahlevi. It may here be pointed out that the Soviet Military authorities had on several occasions stated that no further evacuations would occur and had indicated that the skeleton staff might well leave Pahlevi. Under the circumstances, it was as well that they did not do so.

(b) On 18th. July 1942, Colonel Bronislaw ADAMOWICZ arrived from Tehran with the remainder of the staff of the Polish Evacuation staff No. 1, and took over command from Lt. Col. Borowik. This brought the total permanent Polish Staff to about 450, including 150 A.T.S., mostly Hospital sisters. Subsequent growth of this staff may be judged from the following table:

Date:	Officers	Other Ranks.	A.T.S.	Clerks.	Total.
15.7.42.	8	159	9	-	176
1.8.42	52	276	150	-	478
1.9.42.	181	2336	578	13	3138

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Para. 2 (c) Lt. Col. Lechner took over command from Col. Adamowicz on 10 August but remained under command of Col. Szymanski in Teheran.

(d) The total British Base Evacuation Staff during the peak period consisted of 19 K.C.Os., 11 V.C.Os., 25 B.O.Rs., and 328 I.O.Rs. This was somewhat less than during the first evacuation when, for instance, the number of K.C.Os. was 33.

3. SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION .

(a) The general policy adopted was for the British Staff to supervise general administration of the evacuation, leaving the Poles to manage the details themselves, and to assist where practicable by taking work off their hands. It should be noted that in Pahlevi the organisation and administration, both of military and civilians, was a joint military concern of the British and Polish staffs; when the civilians reached Teheran, they became the responsibility of the Polish Civil Delegation.

(b) The Polish Base Evacuation Staff under Lt. Col. Lechner, with Lt. Col. Borowik and Major Karol ZIMNER as assistants, was housed in a tented camp behind Camp No.1, and directly controlled each of the 5 Camps. Each camp had its own administrative commandant and a small military staff which remained until the camp in question was struck. A delegation from the Polish civil authority in Teheran under M. Jozef Antoszkiewicz, assisted by M. Czeslaw Knauer and Lt. Mieczslaw Odynicki, was sent to Pahlevi to organise the civilian camps under military supervision, and a small delegation from the Polish Red Cross, under M. Medrzewski, was also in Pahlevi during most of the Polish evacuation. The Polish ATS were under the command of Madame Trojanowska.

In addition to the existing Polish staff, Col. Szymanski appointed as personal representative in Pahlevi Major Jan Wilszynski QM to the Polish Forces, who also acted as Chief Liaison Officer to the British Base Evacuation Staff and was responsible for all supply arrangements in the Polish Camps.

4. CONSTRUCTION OF CAMPS .

(a) The original plans provided for the construction of 6 Camps to hold 5,000 each, spread along Kazian Beach, one such camp having been surveyed during the first evacuation. A transit camp was also considered. One cook house and one well were to be provided for each 1,000 persons. This was based on an underestimate placing the peak figure on the beach at about 30,000, whereas in reality this figure was eventually 42,000.

(b) These plans were modified by Col. Adamowicz. The number of camps was laid down as 5 but a spare site was left between Camp Nos.2 and 3 which was afterwards utilised as a convalescent camp and for the 6th. Div hospital. Nos. 1 and 2 were civilian camps, Nos. 3 and 5 were military. No. 4, spare at the beginning, was later used as the ATS Camp and military disinfecting centre. Camps No. 1 and 3 were to receive evacuees before disinfestation, after which they proceeded to Camps Nos. 2 and 5 respectively. The total planned capacity of the five camps was about 40,000.

(c) Upon confirmation that the second evacuation would occur, construction of these camps was promptly put in hand by the Polish sappers under Lieut. Boleslaw Dyki. They had, in addition to the task of preparing for an expected total of 70,000 evacuees, to prepare a camp for the Polish Base Evacuation Staff. It immediately became clear that there was insufficient Polish labour. In consequence Persian labour was employed and a carpenter's shop instituted in Camp No. 2, run by O.C. 16 Fd. Hyg. Sec. and staffed with about 20 Persian carpenters. After this, work progressed rapidly.

(d) B.B.E.S. undertook the responsibility of providing latrines for the whole camp, and the Poles the construction of the necessary wells, cook-houses, fences and mat shelters, in that order of priority. The B.B.E.S. was also responsible for Road Maintenance.

par 4 (e) Shelters proved to be a problem which was never satisfactorily solved with the local material available. During good weather at the beginning of the evacuation the Polish staff decided that only the lightest type of shelter was necessary to give shade during the heat of the day. They proved useless against the autumn rains during the latter part of the evacuation and caused much distress. Later some 90 shelters were built by local contractors to house 100 persons each, of considerably stouter construction and designed to give a steeper roof-fall. These proved adequate except during the heaviest rains. Nevertheless, it was obvious that only standard type tents could give enough protection to the women and children. The Polish Civil Authority rather belatedly sent some 180 tents from Tehran which somewhat relieved the situation. Some 2000 Persian type tents, with a capacity of about 5 persons each, brought in Tehran and sent to Pahlevi, were used to shelter both troops and civilians. They were useful but of too light a material to withstand heavy rains.

(f) The only existing line of communication between the camps lay along the foreshore between the camps and the sea. There was danger that this would become impassable during bad weather. Consequently a series of road tracks were laid from the main Resht-Pahlevi road through scrub and sandhills to the beach. A temporary road was also constructed from Kazian to the beach to take the main stream of traffic from the town, and an old road behind camp No. 2 was cleared of sand to ensure through traffic behind Camp No. 1 and to enable vehicles to reach the civilian embussing point.

(g) As a result of very considerable efforts by the Polish sappers in the carpenter's shop, 400 four-seater latrines, wells and cookhouses for 20,000, and shelters for 12,000 were prepared by August 9th., the day before the first flight arrived. Much of this work was achieved in the face of great difficulty. For instance, on 27 July, a fortnight before the evacuation began, orders were issued by Tenth Army to cease all preparations pending confirmation of the evacuation from the War Office. Five days work was thus lost which was extremely hard to make up.

(h) As the evacuees poured in, it became obvious that the Poles, unaided, would be unable to provide the necessary accommodation. Therefore, until the peak figure of 42,000 was reached, contracts were given out by the L.P.O. for the construction of mat shelters, fences, thatched roofed storehouses, etc. wherever necessary. This work was completed between the 12th. and 25th. August. In addition material was provided for a hospital for the 6th. Polish Division, which was constructed by their own divisional sappers, and for a convalescent camp, to relieve the over-burdened hospital.

5. TRANSPORTATION FROM TRANSCASPIA TO PERSIA.

(a) The ships in which the evacuees arrived from Krasnovodsk were usually tankers which were too big to enter Pahlevi harbour. Consequently they stood about a mile off the harbour mouth and the evacuees had to trans-ship to a smaller vessel which normally landed the whole contingent in two trips. Smaller ships from Krasnovodsk entered the harbour direct.

(b) The first transport arrived, as has been stated, on 10th. Aug., and thereafter ships arrived for the next twenty one days at all hours of the clock. Conditions on board were beyond description. In a successful effort to get as many Poles as possible away from Krasnovodsk in the shortest possible time, the Russian packed the evacuees on board until it was almost impossible to move. Sanitary conditions passed all belief - in the largest tankers there were about 6 lavatories to serve four to five thousand persons. Only the fact that the Poles were inured to all kinds of hardships by their two and a half years in the Soviet Union enabled them to endure the journey.

Para. 5.

(c) The evacuation was carried out in Turkestan by districts. Polish troops were assembled in various localities and round them grouped the civilian population and families which came out with them. For evacuation purposes, Poles from all these localities were sent in mass to Krasnovodsk with the result that military and civilians usually, though not invariably, arrived in the same ship. Certain localities in Turkestan where the Poles had collected were climatically better than others. Thus Poles who came from Yangi Yul were in a reasonable state of health. Those, on the other hand, who came from such regions as Guzar, where they lived in torrid heat with insufficient food, were in a very bad state indeed and civilians from these regions were frequently hardly able to crawl off the ships. Though the number of deaths if considered as a percentage was not high, yet the fact that of 68,000, 568, chiefly civilians, died in Pahlevi largely of malnutrition, is a sad commentary on the manner in which they had lived in Russia.

6. DISSEMBARKATION ARRANGEMENTS.

(a) A special jetty was set aside for disembarkation and repaired by the Soviet Port authorities. It became necessary for the British staff to instal an electric light system as evacuees were frequently landed at night. Entrines were dug in the assembly yard next to the Jetty where a First Aid post, manned by Poles, was also installed. As certain ships were berthed at the main Customs Wharf also, these arrangements were duplicated, though this wharf had a proper lighting system. A Polish disembarkation staff under Lieut. Col. Dabrowski worked most efficiently and required no British assistance.

(b) From the wharves to the camps was a distance of about one mile for the civilians and 2½ miles for the military. The former, among whom were many elderly persons, had to be transported in Polish trucks as they were incapable of covering the distance on foot. The latter were usually too weak to carry their kit which also had to be transported in trucks. The sight of long lines of exhausted men marching to camp along Kazian beach by night, with numbers falling out by the way, is one not easily forgotten.

7. THE EVACUATION AT MTS PEAK.

(a) The outflow of evacuees by convoy to Tehran and Khanaquin could not cope with the influx by ships with the result that the camps rapidly filled until the peak figure of 42,000 was reached on 31 Aug. The peak figure of sick was reached on 8 Sept. when there were 868 in the hospital and about 2000 in the convalescent camp, but as there were many sick in the camps, particularly the civilian camps, who did not report, the total number was certainly greater.

(b) The spectacle presented by Kazian beach during the peak period was one which few Poles or British concerned in the evacuation are likely to forget. The camps extended solidly for about four miles, backed by sandhills and facing the sea. Tents and shelters of all types were inhabited by military and civilians in thousands. So long as the weather remained good, camping conditions were ideal and crowds of men, women and children bathed daily in the Caspian. Though, under the special circumstances, it cannot be said that the normal decencies were always observed, yet the general effect was certainly tonic. The Caspian Sea at Pahlevi is barely saline; considering this and the lack of any other washing facilities (apart from the M.B.U. plants) its value as a health restorer cannot be overestimated.

(c) The task of the commandants of Camp Nos. 3 and 5, where only military personnel were quartered, was comparatively simple once the administrative machine started to function. It would have been easier to make units and formations responsible for their own administration but this was seldom possible owing to the necessity for forming camps previous to the arrival of the many different units evacuated. An exception was the
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case of the 6th. Polish Inf. Div. which successfully occupied and administered for a short time the whole of Camp No. 4

(d) The task of the Commandants of Camp Nos. 1 and 2 was far from simple. Though they collaborated with success with the Polish Civil Delegation they were faced with the problem of organising and administering thousands of civilian evacuees of all ages who were almost all suffering from a severe reaction if not actual illness. The Polish Civil Delegation, in charge of all civilian clothing, blankets, footwear, etc., was also responsible for the registration of all civilians on landing, a formidable task, and for the preparation of civilian parties for convoys, a task almost equally formidable. The Red Cross representatives handled Red Cross Stores and supplies from the Polish/Red Cross organisations in Tehran, and American

(e) Experience in the first evacuation proved that unless canteens were established in the camps, the evacuees tended to buy up commodities in the town in a uncontrolled manner. The Polish authorities therefore arranged with local Persian contractors to instal canteens in each camp. Unfortunately, prices in these canteens soon became excessive, and vodka and other alcoholic liquors appeared on sale. To prevent the spread of disease, it was several times most strongly urged by the British that no fruit should be sold in the camps. The melon crop was at this time being sold throughout Guilan and melon rind and the remains of other fruits constituted a source of danger if left lying about. It was, however, never possible to prevent effectively the sale of fruits in the canteens or elsewhere in the camps. The high prices in the canteens led to the formation of an illegal bazaar behind Camp No. 2 where trafficking of all kinds took place. To counter this, a shop was set up in the Civilian camps under joint Polish and British control, where Poles could sell valuables with the certainty of obtaining fair prices for their jewellery, rings, bracelets, watches, etc.

(f) The civilian evacuees were generally worse sheltered than the military owing to the mistaken policy adopted at the beginning of economising in the type of shelters. The Polish Civil Delegation did not issue Camp No. 1 with blankets and clothing until really bad weather set in. Though Polish A.T.S. were allotted to each shelter to look after the civilians, the required standard of discipline and hygiene could not be maintained and the camp soon became very dirty. Further, it proved difficult to prevent the presence of Persian hawkers and illegal traffickers. It was only by the constant efforts of the 16 Fd. Hyg. Sec. and the employment of Persian labour that it was possible to keep the hygiene situation under control at all. When the rains started, the suffering and discomfort was partly alleviated by borrowing or purchasing tarpaulins and canvas, though these palliatives did not go very far. On the other hand, so pleasant were conditions when the weather was fine that many civilians did not want to leave, even with the memory of being extremely wet fresh in their minds.

(g) The following were the peak figures:-

<u>Date</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>
27 Aug. 42.	23,849	14,642	38,491
31 " "	21,235	20,674	41,909
2 Sep. "	22,898	18,347	41,245

8. CHILDREN'S CONVALESCENT CAMP.

It was early suggested by the British medical authorities that a convalescent camp should be started to take in the weak and undernourished, both military and civilian. The Polish medical authorities after some delay agreed to this. A completely new camp to accommodate upwards of 2000 was accordingly constructed between Camps Nos. 2 and 3. This was rapidly filled but its administration at the beginning left much to be desired.

It was therefore suggested by Captain Schlee that a separate convalescent camp for children should be instituted, to be run under the auspices of 22 Ind. Fd. Amb. with the help of some Polish ladies who volunteered for this work and Polish A.T.S. The Poles agreed to this and on 21 Aug a miniature "Barnardo's Home" arose a mile beyond the limit of No. 5 Camp. Capt. G.A.C. Miller, R.A.M.C., was detailed by O.C. 22 Ind Fd. Amb. to run it, Captain B. Raghobachar, I.M.S. as his assistant. The latter had acquired a knowledge of Polish in Pahlevi. A number of I.O.Rs. were detailed to assist with the children. The camp became so popular with the I.O.Rs. of 22 Ind. Fd. Amb. that there were many applications from those not so detailed to be allowed to work there.

Excellent huts of thatch and reed were built in three days by Lieut. A. B. E. Graham, I.E. and a number of tents were supplied by 22 Ind. Fd. Amb. The final number of huts was 11.

The children chosen were between the ages of 8 and 12, with no organic disease but suffering from acute malnutrition. The age limits were later altered to include children from 3 to 15 years old. They were selected by Mrs. Sheean, head of the British Red Cross in Tehran, who had kindly volunteered to help the B.B.E.B. in Pahlevi. Mrs. Methven, wife of the secretary to the British Military Attache in Tehran, herself a Pole, also came to Pahlevi and did most excellent work in this camp.

A modest beginning was made with 50 children who gained so much benefit that it was decided to expand the camp to take the greatest possible number. The Polish Staff was increased to about 60 A.T.S. under A.T.S. Commandant Madame Tyszkowska. A small hospital of twenty beds plus a further twenty "detention" beds was kept practically full throughout the month, most of the cases being malaria and anaemia. 70 cases were evacuated to the Polish Hospital, and one death occurred following an attack of epilepsy. 451 children of a total of 522 were discharged in an improved condition. Their average stay in the Camp was 72 days and their average increase in weight during this period was 2lbs. 1 oz.

It is to be regretted that further expansion was not possible owing to the appearance of typhoid among the evacuees, which precluded the intake of more children. The last child left on the 25th. September.

9. CLEARANCE FROM PAHLEVI.

(a) Camps were struck as soon as decrease in numbers was sufficient to warrant it, but for purposes of dispersal no concentration of Poles took place in any one area until the very end. Ordnance stores were returned to R.O.D. and certain R.E. Stores such as mats and timber were forwarded to Hamadan under instructions from C.R.E. Tehran. Fortunately the Soviet Port authorities requested that all other timber lengths and wood used for wells and latrines should be handed over to them for the construction of sheds for lease-lend stores of which a great deal had accumulated in Pahlevi. It was not though right to ask payment for this wood which, in any case, would have been difficult to dispose of, and the fact that the Russians undertook to assist in dismantling and carrying away materials saved great trouble and possible expenditure.

(b) Convoys to the South carried about 1000 military and 400 to 500 civilians daily. These convoys left early in the morning and made a halt at Rūdhbar where tea was provided. A halt for the night was made at /Kasvin

Kasvin where a staging camp and hospital were placed. Here the convoys split, the civilians going to Tehran and the large majority of the military to Khanaqin. Between 13 and 27 Aug., 20,000 were evacuated; by 8 Sept., 40,000; and by 18 Sept., 60,000. From this date the rates slowed down as problems of transporting sick, reducing the permanent staff, etc., required solution. The last civilians, excluding sick in hospital, left on 12 Oct. By 18th. Oct., not more than 100 Poles remained, consisting of permanent staff, sappers and O.Rs., to assist in clearing up the camps, the hospitals and the beach. On 22 Oct. there remained 45 sick in hospital who were gradually evacuated to Tehran. The British B.E.S. was also reduced. On Nov. 1st., Lt. Col. Lechner assisted with the remaining British Staff of Officers at the dedication of the Polish cemetery in Pahlevi. He left on 3rd. Nov. leaving 5 serious cases and three medical staff in the Persian Hospital in Pahlevi. The B.B.E.S. left Pahlevi on 4th. Nov.

10. VISIT OF GENERAL ANDERS.

The Commander in Chief, Polish Forces, visited Pahlevi on the 28th. Aug. and remained two days. He inspected all the camps, including "Barnardo's" and the Polish Hospital. On the morning of the 29th. Aug., he witnessed a march-past of some 15,000 military, including A.T.S. and addressed both military and civilians. The majority participating in the parade were drawn from the 5th. and 6th. Inf. Divs. whose commanders, Major-Generals Bronislaw Rakowski and Michal Tokarzewski, were also present. His presence had a most heartening effect on all the Poles in Pahlevi and the enthusiasm with which he was acclaimed bore witness to his inspiring leadership.

11. RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS.

The presence of Lt. Col. N.S. Kireyeff of the Soviet Army, as chief Soviet Liaison Officer in Pahlevi, was enough to ensure that relations with the Russians were excellent. This charming and able officer, who arrived during the latter part of the first evacuation and subsequently returned to Soviet Russia, came back to Pahlevi for the whole of the second evacuation. He was most helpful in every way during the latter, and under his influence Soviet officials in Pahlevi, both military and otherwise, adopted a most friendly attitude. The difficulties of the B.B.E.S. and of the Polish staff were fully appreciated by him and it is probable that the Soviet officials in Pahlevi are now very much more anglophil than they were previous to the evacuation. Relations with the Soviet Consul General were also excellent.

12. RELATIONS WITH THE IRANIANS.

Relations with the local Iranian authorities were good throughout the whole period under review. Given the situation obtaining in Guilan it was only natural that a certain amount of nervousness should have been displayed by the local functionaries in any except purely official relation, but an appreciative comprehension of their difficulties was very quickly reciprocated, and officers of the B.B.E.S. can bear witness to the traditional courtesy and hospitality.

Particular mention should be made of M. Majd, the Governor-General of Guilan, whose attitude was obviously Anglophil; of M. Chaloupe, the Governor of Pahlevi, who was appointed only in June 1942; of the Chief of Police of Guilan, a professional soldier who was always willing to cooperate, and of M. Hossein Behra, the Director of Pahlevi Port, a Government engineer with a mastery of the French, English and Russian languages.

PART II - SERVICE REPORTS.

1. ENGINEERING.

(a) The entire planning and laying out of the camps was the work of the Polish Staff; Polish sappers under Lieut. Boleslaw Dyki, later under Capt. Wladyslaw Gajewski, bore the brunt of the work. The number of sappers available was inadequate throughout the evacuation and the personnel was to a large extent used to supervise the Persian labour that had to be employed, the maximum number of which used in one day being about 200. Mention should be made of the rapidity and efficiency with which the Poles constructed wells. Later on during the evacuation several contracts were given out for this work which proved far more costly and less satisfactory than those built by the Poles. Before the first transport arrived, Polish sappers with Persian labour had completed wells and cook-houses for 30,000 persons, mat shelters for about 12,000, and the fencing for all five camps. The camp for the permanent staff, with wells and cook-houses, was also in readiness; I.P. tents for M.I. rooms and first aid posts were erected in each camp; and thatched buildings for offices and stores were nearing completion.

- (i) Wells. Good water was available on the beach at a depth of 1 to 1½ metres. Wells, rivetted with wood, were dug to ensure a continuous water supply, one for each two cook-houses.
- (ii) Cook-houses. Cook-houses consisted of mat shelters with brick fireplaces. There were four per camp, each one serving 1200 persons. Some were subsequently roofed with metal from old tins to give protection against rain.
- (iii) Fences. Wooden fences were built between each camp, but without barbed wire, were ineffective. A strong fence was later built outside Camp. No. 1 to keep out Persian hawkers.
- (iv) Shelters. In addition to the above mentioned shelters, 14 thatched buildings and kitchens for the children's camp were constructed. This provided first-class protection during the heaviest rains. Two thatched bath houses for the S.I. M.B.U. were erected as well as various cook-houses for B.O.Rs.; the premises occupied by the Field Bakery were repaired and considerable cement work done for the slaughter house.

(b) Lt. A.B.E. Graham, I.E., arrived on 7 Aug. and undertook construction of a road system. Four roads were laid with reeds totalling 2700 yards in length. An old road covered with sand for a distance of 600 yds. was cleared of 3000 cubic feet of sand.

(c) In pursuance of the policy of relieving the Poles of work, it was decided to give out contracts for the following work inside the camps after the evacuation started:

60 improved mat shelters to accommodate 100 persons each, for Camps Nos. 1 and 5.

A complete convalescent camp with offices, stores, cook-houses and wells, to accommodate 2,500 persons.

A high fence 700 yds. long in Camp. No.1

10 thatched buildings for camp offices and stores.

All the above work was completed between 12th. and 25th. Aug.

HYGIENE.

On completion of the first Polish evacuation, 16 Md. Hyg. Sec., Captain Aminul Haq I.M.S., moved to Tehran but left one sub-section Sgt. H.K.W. Aucock R.A.M.C. at Pahlevi. One more sub-section S/Sgt. R.G. Elbrow R.A.M.C. arrived in Pahlevi on 1 Aug.

On receipt of information that the second evacuation would Sgt. Aucock's sub-section began preparation of latrines along the line of sand dunes behind the proposed camp sites. They consisted of latched boxes of rough wood covered with hessian and having fly proof covers. This urgent construction and digging required a large number of workers which the Poles could not provide, and Persian labour was employed under contract. Further, when the original estimate of peak figures was suddenly raised, latrine and other hygiene requirements had to be revised accordingly. Owing to lack of iron receptacles, large numbers of wooden boxes and kerosene oil tins were produced and purchased locally. Box seat latrines were constructed for the many people and children expected, and for the camp M.I. centres where trench latrines could not be dug because of proximity to the beach. Shallow pits were constructed for disposal of night soil.

e) Fouling of large areas inside the camps was particularly marked during the first days of the evacuation. This was probably due to weak digestion, sudden change of food and in some degree to ignorance on the part of the children. The result was a considerable amount of fly breeding. At the end of the first fortnight, to counter which fly traps and muslin screens were provided and meat safes were constructed. Abnormal fouling of revets occurred many of them unserviceable. In such cases, new ones were constructed, using the old revets on new sites wherever possible. Sometimes a shallowly dug latrine had to be closed after 24 hours. This became such that large squads of Persians had to be employed to deal with the cleaning and maintain an adequate number of latrines.

f) When typhoid appeared, precautions were taken that it should not spread to the hospital staff by providing separate latrines with strong disinfectants, flyproof safes and protection for food.

g) Since the water supply came from shallow wells dug near the latrines, and in some cases in line with and proximity to the latrines, it was feared that contamination might occur. A water squad was therefore formed of 10 Polish A.T.S., who were trained to carry out water tests, disinfection and dechlorination. Each well was tested once a day and chlorinated twice, sometimes thrice a day. Forty gallon drums were provided at each kitchen for drinking water which were separately chlorinated and dechlorinated. Polish guards were kept on the wells. The Polish Hospital had a number of Persian concrete wells of which those reserved for drinking purposes were covered and sterilised. There was no water-borne epidemic during the evacuation.

h) Washing platforms with grease trap and soakage pits were constructed beside each kitchen, and at short notice within convalescent camps.

i) Two incinerators were constructed in each camp and a requisite number at Polish HQ, the Polish Hospital and the convalescent camps. These were of beehive type as the refuse burnt was very considerable.

j) As the number of Polish evacuees available for work increased, unskilled labour and tradesmen were replaced by Poles. 157 Polish Militiamen and 25 civilian workers, 11 A.T.S. and 6 sapper carpenters were employed for hygiene, but the high incidence of sickness among them made it impracticable to dispose altogether of Persian labour.

(1) As camps were vacated, latrine boxes were removed, latrines filled and sealed with crude oil. The empty sites became an attractive area for pigs and carrion birds. Steps were accordingly taken to bury exposed refuse, burn it when possible, and leave the sites thoroughly cleansed. Latrine boxes and covers were deposited in a central dump and eventually delivered to the Russians who agreed to take them over for building purposes.

3. BATHING AND DISINFESTATION.

(a) 31 M.B.U. , commanded by Lieut. H.S. Irwin, Pioneer Corps, arrived in Pahlevi from Tehran on the 31 July. The first site selected by the Poles proved unsatisfactory and it was decided to have two plants for military and two for civilians, the latter to be near Camp No. 2 and the troops to bathe on the beach at Camp No. 4. Wells were sunk forthwith and tented plant erected on both sites. Owing to the acute shortage of tents, arrangements were made to employ carpenters and Persian labour of 16 Fd. Hyg. Sec. in the erection of reed and thatched huts.

(b) Bathing began on 11 Aug. with two plants in both the civilian and military camps, another being partly finished. In the first five days (11th. to 15th. Aug) 13,691 troops and civilians were bathed and disinfested. The unit was then working from 0700 hrs. to 1900 hrs. in two shifts of 6 hours each. The average rose from 2,740 per day to 3,256 on 21 Aug, by which time both the military and civilian "Clean camps" were full. From this date, the unit had merely to keep pace with the rate of evacuation from Pahlevi and a twelve hour working day was no longer required.

(c) Bathing proceeded faster than disinfestation, but as troops and, in many cases, civilians were provided with new clothing there was no delay. When discarded battle dress and other kit started to accumulate T.O.T. disinfestors were sent from Tehran. These machines were the only ones available as the unit was already operating three Mark III Disinfestors and one A.S.H. Portable (previously in charge of 22 Ind. Fd. Amb.) which were the only ones in Tehran Sub Area. The T.O.T. machines arrived on the 20th. Aug; 8 were set up for military use at Camp No. 4 and 2 for civilian use at Camp No. 2. From this date, disinfestation kept pace with bathing.

(d) Owing to the exhausted state of the civilian evacuees it was at first impossible to employ Poles as washerwomen, and Persian women were engaged. Later, as the evacuees regained their strength Persian labour was dismissed and Polish labour substituted.

(e) For a task of this magnitude the unit and attached disinfestor unit were weak, the total strength being one officer and 37 O.Rs. This was the minimum required for efficiency and resulted in a severe strain on the personnel at the beginning of the evacuation. Assistance was eventually obtained from the Poles and a Polish sergeant who worked very well was posted to the unit. In the civilian camps clothing was frequently taken direct from the dirty camp to the clean camp by lorry without passing through the disinfestor. The clean camp consequently became a dirty one very soon and the work of the unit was increased because many people had to be disinfested more than once.

(f) A small squad of 12 Polish A.T.S. was put through a short training course towards the end of the evacuation which it was hoped would be of use in any stations where they might subsequently find themselves.

4. MEDICAL SERVICES

(a) The 22 Ind Fd Amb, commanded by Lieut-Col. M. Ata-Ullah, I.M.S., was present throughout the evacuation and was responsible for the general supervision of all medical arrangements and for advising the Polish Medical Staff.

(b) The general physical condition of evacuees on arrival at Pahlevi was very unsatisfactory. The great majority showed signs of prolonged malnutrition and a large number of hospital admissions were due to deficiency diseases. The sickness rate during the second evacuation was about five times that of the first.

(c) A large part of the 1200 bed Polish Hospital in Tehran was moved to Pahlevi and was ready to receive patients just before the beginning of the second evacuation. However, with the arrival of the first ship-load of evacuees it was obvious that the hospital would be quite inadequate. Although the British and Polish authorities recognised that a certain reserve of accommodation must be maintained in the early stages, practically all of it was used within the first week, and many seriously sick had to be refused admission. There was undue delay in the organisation of the convalescent camp immediately suggested by the British, which finally started to function perfunctorily after a fortnight and soon became another hospital for serious cases. If this camp had been properly used it would have been unnecessary to bring the remaining hospital equipment from Tehran, but as the Polish authorities insisted this was done the new accommodation being quickly filled. The peak figure of 2000 in the convalescent camp was not shown in hospital returns but should be considered in the total sickness. The 6th Polish Division decided to look after its own sick and asked the British authorities to provide facilities for the construction of a temporary hospital in camp No. 4, which was done in 36 hours by their own sappers.

(d) The most prevalent diseases were dysentery, diarrhoea, deficiency diseases, many malarias imported from Russia, and typhoid. Thanks to the warm weather there was no typhus. For a short time a certain number of shelters in Camp No. 5 were set aside to take malaria cases, but this was closed down by the Poles themselves on receipt of instructions that all malaria patients must rejoin their units. This section was under Capt. B. Mahadevan, I.M.S.

(e) 17 Motor Amb Sess could provide an average of only three ambulances a day to transport the lying sick to Tehran. The majority of patients had to go by bus. Towards the end of the evacuation a staging post was established at Manjil to give the seriously sick 2½ days instead of 1½ for the journey.

(f) Polish medical arrangements throughout were under the direction of Major Jan Gajek, except for a short interval when Col. Jozef Oktawiec, I.M.S., Polish Forces, assumed charge.

LOCAL PURCHASE

(a) Local purchase was the function of Capt. R. Schlee, Gen. List, B.M.M. Demands on local resources came under the headings of food and fuel, building materials, roads and labour, Ordnance stores, M.T. spares and P.O.L. for Polish transport.

(b) It was inevitable that these very considerable demands should result in an increase in the local cost of living. Certain articles of food, notably eggs, trebled in price, and meat became extremely difficult to obtain in the local market. Bricks rose from 180 rials per thousand to 320 rials in September; boards became virtually unobtainable; earthenware pots rose from 35 rials per kilo to 50 rials. Poor communications and lack of transport limited the quantity of goods and materials that could be brought into the local market every day, and bad weather and other conditions occasionally held up the arrival of supplies, notably fuel and firewood. It was decided, as a general principle, to fix a maximum price for certain standard requirements, which would ensure ample supplies being brought to the market, and not to attempt to buy more than the quantity of such articles available on any given day. If sellers refused to sell they were left with their goods and usually became more available in a day or two. This policy could of course only be applied to certain articles of which the B.B.E.S. were overwhelmingly the largest items, such as mats, timber and cooking pots.

In the case of goods for which there was a regular civilian demand on a considerable scale such as bricks, firewood and foodstuffs, it was necessary to conform to the prevailing market prices.

(c) Building materials were supplied by a local merchant recommended by the Imperial Bank of Iran in Resht, and fresh supplies by Khan Sahib Mullick, a F.S.D. contractor from Tehran. Close touch was kept with the local market to ensure that prices were kept as reasonable as circumstances permitted. Although these were high compared with normal times they were generally much cheaper than during the first evacuation, and economic dislocation in Pahlevi was reduced to a minimum; some, however, was inevitable with an influx of 70,000 into a town with a population of about 15,000. In order to save time and get material on the spot as quickly as possible, and in the absence of any staff capable of running a R.E. dump, it was necessary to authorise the Poles and the Hygiene Section to draw materials from the contractor's suppliers on demand. Payments were made to the contractor against his production of receipts. This system worked fairly well and resulted in rapid deliveries.

(d) The total local expenditure from August to October, excluding food supplies locally purchased and payment for U.K.C.C. transport was Rs 5,144,589 which is the equivalent of about 11/6d per head.

6. SUPPLIES.

(a) The F.S.D. was under the command of Captain E.W.H. Ellcome, R.I.A.S.C., After consultation between the British and Polish Supply Officers, it was decided that 20,000 dry rations should be issued to the Poles to be ready in the camps for immediate consumption. The day before the arrival of the first evacuees, 8,000 fresh rations were issued to be ready for consumption as required. Subsequently, the Polish Supply Staff expressed the desire that rations be issued two days in advance; this system, after being given a trial, proved unsatisfactory, the decision to abandon it being confirmed by O.C. 17 Sup. Pers. Coy. during his visit to Pahlevi.

(b) Owing to the lack of precise information as to the date and scope of the evacuation, it was not possible to adhere rigidly to a pre-conceived programme. For instance, the existing town slaughter-house was found to be inadequate and a military slaughter-house had to be hastily erected. Later, on the instructions of D.D.S.& T., this was improved. The Contractor had at first experienced certain difficulties providing the quantity and quality of meat on hoof continuously required (the maximum slaughter on one day was approximately 350 sheep and 100 cattle), but his organisation was subsequently able to deal with the situation. The necessarily large daily issues - approximately 1,250,000 rations were issued, and approximately 3,000 rations (B.T. scale) per diem to the Polish permanent staff - quickly began to deplete the stocks available in the F.S.D. and on several occasions, supplies of sugar, fresh cheeses, salt, dates, cigarettes, clarified butter, (in lieu of margarine), and various other commodities had to be supplemented by local purchase. In spite of many difficulties experienced by the Contractor, fresh supplies and hospital requirements were generally of a high standard. Surplus issued was handed back to F.S.D. by the Polish Q.M. and credited to stocks.

(c) Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the value of the large periodical consignments of flour, beans and "Klim" received from the/ Red Cross as gifts for the Polish Evacuees. American

(d) The attitude of the Russian authorities in the matter of local purchase was always helpful and co-operative.

7. ORDNANCE.

(a) Under Lieut. V.J.E. Wilkinson, I.A.O.C., the R.O.D. remained in existence after the first evacuation and was therefore ready to function again when the second evacuation was announced. It was, as previously, situated on the eastern extremity of Kazian in a tented camp.

(b) As in the first evacuation, Polish troops arrived fully equipped with British uniforms, boots, greatcoats, steel helmets, blankets and leather equipment. Consequently, with the exception of Summer clothing, issues were small. Approximately 251 tons of clothing and stores were delivered to the Poles, the latter consisting mainly of camp equipment. 2058 Iranian and 149 Army I.P. tents were in use as well as 13 waterproof covers and 86 locally purchased covers of various sizes. Owing to lack of Red Cross supplies, it was found necessary to issue the civilian evacuees with 20,000 blankets, 6,160 pairs of canvas shoes and 2,000 hand towels. The blankets were given on loan and arrangements were made with Tehran to collect them from the civilians on arrival there. On three or four occasions, the Poles took delivery direct from U.K.C.C. trucks of stores which were intended for ordnance, but these were eventually all cleared.

(c) Fatigue parties were obtained from the Polish troops who also supplied a daily guard at the Ordnance Camp.

8. TRANSPORT.

(a) A great shortage of transport for the delivery of materials at the beginning was overcome by occasional local hiring of lorries and horse transport. On 18 July, ten Polish lorries arrived from Tehran which were increased early in August to 50. They proved sufficient and remained in Pahlevi till the last phase of the evacuation.

(b) The S.T.O. took over his duties on August 1st. The total British transport in the area was approximately 70 vehicles. Repairs were carried out by the L.A.D. of 22 Fd. Amb., but it was necessary to purchase tools locally to enable them to work. With the limited equipment available, use had to be made of outside workshops for major repair work.

(c) The staff of 1 Electrician and 4 Mechanics was always fully worked and, in their absence, the W/S section would certainly have been needed. An additional strain was imposed owing to the fact that the W/S Section in Tehran could not attend to the needs of the M.A.S. responsible for evacuating sick between Pahlevi and Tehran, and all repairs to this unit had to be done in Pahlevi.

(d) Calls on transport for Station duty were very great. On the arrival of a ship, large numbers of trucks were needed for lifting baggage. Every soldier disembarked with at least 60 lbs. of kit besides which there were unit records and baggage belonging to individual units. Civilians also brought considerable baggage. The weak and sick, of which there were many, had to be carried in lorries. Daily deliveries of dry rations, fire wood, flour to bakers, bread from bakers, meat and vegetables from contractors, etc., called for the constant employment of a great many vehicles when evacuees in the camps approached peak figure. The delivery of materials for camp construction was continuous until the last transport arrived on the 26 Aug., and the G.E. engaged 3 lorries daily in delivering material for road construction and maintenance. A motor bus service was organised which ran the whole length of the Camps (5½ Kilometres) and from there continued to the Hospital, H.Q. Camp, and British H.Q. in Kazian.

8. MOVEMENT CONTROL.

(a) Movement Control was under Major C. Clifton, Ox. & Bucks. L.I. The Movement plan for the evacuation was to lift 1,000 military personnel daily to Khanaquin and from 400 to 500 civilians daily to Tehran. The U.K.C.C. undertook to provide trucks and buses for the civilians. This plan was carried out without any major hitch except towards the end of the evacuation when, owing to lack of numbers and other circumstances, it was impossible to arrange such large convoys.

(b) Two embussing points were used, the military one being on the Pahlevi/Resht road about 4 Kilometres from Kazian. Trucks were marshalled the day before in a fenced-in enclosure near the aerodrome as in the last evacuation, and were sent up to the embussing point in batches of ten under Polish guides. This method proved quite successful, but naturally took longer than if simultaneous embussing of all troops had been carried out at the assembly point. This was not done because it would have meant a 2½ mile march for the troops and it was doubtful if they could have managed it at the beginning. The British M.C.O. supervised the embussing at each point, assisted by Polish Movement Control staff. Mr. Beecher, local representative of the U.K.C.C., was in control of the marshalling and the assembly point. Embussing began each morning at 0600 hrs. and was completed between 0730 and 0800 hrs. There were occasional delays due, for instance, to trucks failing to start, especially during this wet weather, and to the slowness of some units in embussing. On the whole, the Polish organisation for embussing was highly successful.

(c) Each convoy of 50 trucks, carrying about 1000 persons, included 2 trucks for baggage, one as ambulance and three spares. Baggage trucks were loaded in the evening and left at the assembly point under a Polish guard. As the trucks were of all sorts and sizes the M.C.O. and Polish M.T. representative marked up the carrying capacity of each truck after they had been marshalled. The Poles then were able to detail exact numbers.

(d) The civilians were embussed within 400 yds. of Camp No.2. At first buses marshalled the day before at the embussing point but later it was found convenient to marshal them with the military trucks and send them down to the embussing point in the morning. A British M.O. was present at the embussing point to weed out the sick for many evacuees who were obviously ill, or when contingents for E. Africa were selected, would be unfit for further travel. Heavy baggage was despatched in bulk, hand luggage only being taken on the convoys.

(e) Both trucks and buses were searched to ensure that drivers did not carry contraband goods such as sacks of rice, baskets of fish, pumpkins and reed mats which, if discovered, were confiscated and handed over to the U.K.C.C. The biggest haul was 12 sacks of rice.

(f) The total number of convoys was as follows:

Convoys to Khanaquin	91	
Convoys to Tehran	52	(of which 7 were military personnel).
Sick Convoys	54.	

10. SIGNALS.

(a) On 8th. May Lieut. A.K. Wade-Smith assumed command of Signals Detachment and remained until he left for Tehran on the 25th. Sept. when a Sergeant from Tehran Ciphers arrived to assist in that department.

Para. 10

(b) Communication was maintained during the interval between the first and second evacuations although the volume of traffic was at no time very great. On 24 Aug., at 0600 hrs., communication was established with KMS, and the Polevac Group comprising TRN-PLV-HDN-KMS proceeded to work satisfactorily. At one period it was necessary for batteries to be charged locally and new batteries had to be purchased at Resht at a cost of Rials 4,000/- per battery. Though communication was maintained throughout the evacuation, a faulty receiver enforced the reading of signals at just audible strength over the period 19th. to 28th. September. The fault proved to be beyond repair by the detachment electrician due to lack of proper equipment and it was not until Major Newell, O.C. No.3 Coy., Tenth Army Signals, arrived from Tehran on 28th. Sept. bringing a new No.11 Set, that normal communication was resumed. Major Newell inspected the detachment and left for Kasvin on 30th. Sept.

(c) On 24 Aug., Lieut. Wade-Smith and N.C.O. I/C.W/T. Det visited No.1 Polish Camp to inspect W/P set installed there by a Polish wireless officer. Lt. Wade-Smith was informed that this set had in fact established communication with Tehran and was actually open for 4 hours daily. On receipt of instructions from Tehran, the Poles were requested to close down this link, which had been set up without Russian consent.

(d) Experiments were carried out with a view to establishing communications with Krasnovodsk. To facilitate them, two Polish N.C.Os. were allowed to use a No.11 set for one hour each night from 15 to 18 Aug. All attempts were unsuccessful.

(e) The volume of traffic passed by No.11 set over the period 10th. Aug. to 10th. Oct. was:

IN 17,774 groups.
OUT 29,962 "

11. AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS.

The state of war in the North Caucasus rendered necessary the institution of Air raid precautions and orders were issued by the Polish staff to give certain general instructions to the Camps. A temporary HQ for the British staff was erected beyond Camp No. 5 for use in an emergency. This site and the shelters erected there were also used for the children's camp. It was, however, fortunate that no enemy action was taken as, under the existing circumstances dispersal was almost impossible. The many hundreds of tents, to kutch which was impracticable, formed an excellent target. One hostile aircraft flew over Pahlevi on 9th. Sept and dropped leaflets in the Azerbaijan language. The aeroplane had previously visited Naushahr and appeared to have lost its bearings. It was flying at a great height and was afterwards reported by the Russians to have been brought down near Tiflis.

12. CONCLUSION.

The task of receiving, accommodating, disinfecting, clothing, feeding and despatching by convoy nearly 70,000 Polish men, women and children took from 10th. Aug. to 3rd. Nov. The fact that this was accomplished without any serious hitch is due not only to the organisation which had been set up before the evacuation took place, but also to the good collaboration between Poles, British, Russians and Persians which was one of the features of the Evacuation.

* * * * *

A.F.F.E.R.D.I.A. "A"

BRITISH INFANTRY BATTAL, RAHAVA.

NAME RANK REGT/COMP POSTING A POINTMENT M.C.A. DUTIES

HEADQUARTERS.

A. ROSS.	Lt. Col.	H.L.I.	H.Q. TENTH ARMY.	A.A. & Q.M.G.	O.C., B.B.E.S. and Stn. Comd.
*C.F. MAHONEY	Lt. Col.	I.R.B.O.	3 AMB. Pioneer Bn.	O.C.	Encl. in Coy. B.B.E.S. & Stn.
G. CLIFTON.	Major	Ok & Bucks	L.I. M.C. Iraq/Persia.	D.A.Q.M.G. (M)	Senior M.C.O.
G.S.A. PHILING.	Captain.	4 Mosby	Cdr. M.C. Iraq/Persia.	M.C.O.	Adjutant B.B.E.S., S.S.O., M.C.O.
R. SCHER.	Captain.	Gen. List.	26, B.M.M.	L.O.	Local Purchase Officer.
J.H. CHENKI	Lt.	S.A.A.F.	26, B.M.M.	L.O.	Medical L.O.
D.J. NEVILLE	Lt.	13 P.F.A.	4/13 P.F.A.	Coy. Offr.	M.C.O.

SUPPLIES.

R.H.H. BILACORR Capt. R.I.A.S.C. 145 S.P./4 O.C. O.C., P.S.D.

ORDNANCE.

V.J.E. WILKINSON Lt. I.A.O.G. R.O.D., T.H. O.C. O.C., R.O.D.

ENGINEER.

A.G.F. GRAMM Lt. I.S. 202 Works. S.O.R.S. Stn. Engineer.

TRANSPORT.

D. MACKENZIE 2/Lt. R.I.A.S.C. 22 Ind. Pl. Amb. M.T.O. Stn. Tpt. Officer.

LOGALS

A.K. WAD - SMITH Lt. C. G.I. Tenth Army Sigs. Cipher Officer. C/c Sigs. Det. & Cipher Offr.

*Lt-Col. G.F. MAHONEY left PIV at the end of August.

A P P E N D I X "B" - Details of Arrivals by Formations and Categories.

Transport No.	DATE	UNIT	Officers	Other Ranks	Troops	Military Employees	A.S.S.	Boys	Girls	TOTAL	MILITARY TOTAL	MEN	WOMEN	CHILDREN	CIVIL TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
1.	10/8/42	6th. 7th. Inf. Div.	200	3163	3362	9	50	911	-	970	4332	29	218	79	326	4658
2.	11/8/42	" " " "	134	2372	2506	1	-	-	-	1	2507	91	405	425	921	3428
3.	12/8/42	" " " "	15	81	96	2	2	-	-	4	100	326	1902	1274	3501	3601
4.	14/8/42	" " " "	204	3229	4133	1	11	2	-	14	4147	-	-	-	-	4147
5.	14/8/42	7th. Inf. Div.	127	2158	2285	8	113	43	-	164	2449	93	652	1343	1088	3537
6.	14/8/42	5th. Inf. Div. & Army Staff.	169	2428	2597	19	223	1	-	243	2840	164	891	510	1565	4405
7.	17/8/42	5th. 6th. Inf. Div.	79	1315	1384	-	25	1	-	26	1410	595	1080	1384	3059	4469
8.	18/8/42	5th. Inf. Div. & Staff.	196	1424	1620	7	536	1	396	940	2560	278	1115	752	2154	4714
9.	18/8/42	" " " "	115	1516	1630	6	97	-	-	103	1733	1	10	5	16	1749
10.	19/8/42	" " " "	203	3092	3295	7	26	394	-	427	3722	75	414	263	752	4474
11.	20/8/42	Staff Coll. & Hq.	125	1810	1935	7	183	-	-	189	2124	354	953	954	2261	4385
12.	22/8/42	6th. Inf. Div.	221	2991	3212	2	78	-	204	282	3494	138	425	488	1051	4545
13.	23/8/42	" " " "	3	17	20	-	-	-	-	-	20	59	226	237	522	542
14.	25/8/42	" " " "	139	3087	3226	-	27	-	-	27	3253	181	737	377	1195	4448
15.	25/8/42	" " " "	25	541	566	-	42	306	485	783	1349	3	26	71	100	1449
16.	25/8/42	" " " "	16	611	627	-	-	-	-	-	627	-	-	-	-	627
17.	26/8/42	" " " "	54	830	884	13	51	-	-	64	948	17	48	10	75	1023
18.	26/8/42	" " & Army Staff.	65	1243	1308	1	13	-	-	14	1322	12	27	11	51	1373
19.	26/8/42	" " " "	30	335	365	1	53	-	-	54	419	198	462	313	973	1392
20.	30/8/42	5th. 6th. Inf. Div. St.	14	80	94	2	2	1	-	5	99	992	2246	1730	4968	5067
21.	30/8/42	6th. Inf. Div. Base St.	56	571	627	3	8	-	-	11	638	86	183	204	473	1111
22.	30/8/42	" " " "	28	581	609	1	78	27	-	106	715	-	19	13	32	747
23.	1/9/42	7th. Inf. Div. Army Hq.	121	1190	1311	19	59	16	-	94	1405	4	1	1	6	1411
24.	1/9/42	5th. Inf. Div.	8	166	174	-	3	-	-	3	177	16	9	6	31	208
25.	1/9/42	" " " "	56	821	877	2	88	-	-	87	964	47	83	181	311	1275
26.	1/9/42	Krasnodovsk Staff	27	360	384	1	1	-	-	4	388	-	5	-	7	395
			2430	36701	39131	112	1765	1703	1035	4615	43746	3759	12037	9633	25501	69247

APPENDIX "C" - DETAILS OF DEPARTURES FROM PAHLEVI.

DATE.	MILITARY DEPARTURES.	RUNNING NO- TAL.	CIVILIAN DEPARTURES.	RUNNING TOTAL.	CONSOLIDATED RUNNING TOTAL.
13.8.42.	1051	1012	315	300	1312
14.8.42.	1039	2037	184	480	2517
15.8.42.	1913	3257	15	486	3743
16.8.42.	1086	4380	110	590	4970
17.8.42.	1132	5507	26	611	6118
18.8.42.	1320	6836	772	1367	8193
19.8.42.	1195	8081	257	1520	9021
20.8.42.	1112	9143	284	1873	11016
21.8.42.	1141	10284	285	2155	12439
22.8.42.	1170	10454	45	2200	12654
23.8.42.	1446	11900	883	3083	14983
24.8.42.	1243	13143	139	3222	16365
25.8.42.	1188	14331	283	3505	17836
26.8.42.	1172	15503	455	3960	19463
27.8.42.	1068	16571	310	4270	20841
28.8.42.	1009	17580	262	4532	21012
29.8.42.	1139	18719	30	4562	23281
30.8.42.	1126	19824	532	5094	24818
31.8.42.	1097	20921	379	5473	26394
1.9.42.	1269	21190	1579	7052	28242
2.9.42.	2171	23361	1278	8330	31691
3.9.42.	1047	24408	490	8820	33228
4.9.42.	1054	25462	570	9390	34852
5.9.42.	1098	26560	432	9822	36382
6.9.42.	1154	27714	622	10444	38158
7.9.42.	1099	28813	345	10689	39508
8.9.42.	605	29418	310	10999	40417
9.9.42.	1110	30528	237	11236	41764
10.9.42.	1560	32088	684	11920	44008
11.9.42.	1239	33327	392	12312	45639
12.9.42.	2104	35431	283	12595	48026
13.9.42.	1695	37126	311	12906	50032
14.9.42.	380	37506	206	13112	50618
15.9.42.	191	37697	934	14046	51743
16.9.42.	108	37805	341	14307	52182
17.9.42.	31	37836	2086	16473	54309
18.9.42.	44	37880	986	17529	55339
19.9.42.	25	37905	823	18382	56187
20.9.42.	195195	38100	728	19110	57110
21.9.42.	30	38130	827	19937	57967
22.9.42.	55	38185	1250	21187	59272
23.9.42.	18	38203	1157	22344	60447
24.9.42.	50	38253	1036	23380	61533
25.9.42.	41	38294	24	23404	61598
26.9.42.	51	38345	129	23533	61788
27.9.42.	40	38385	128	23661	61946
28.9.42.	49	38434	143	23804	62138
29.9.42.	-	38434	-	23804	62138
30.9.42.	91	38525	29	23833	63439
1.10.42.	1146	39671	35	23868	64383
2.10.42.	931	40602	13	23881	64731
3.10.42.	328	40930	20	23901	64969
4.10.42.	633	41563	5	23906	65724
5.10.42.	331	41894	24	23930	65782
6.10.42.	53	41947	5	23935	65873
7.10.42.	90	42037	1	23936	66075
8.10.42.	193	42230	9	23945	66151
9.10.42.	54	42284	22	23967	66222
10.10.42.	67	42351	4	23971	66293
1.10.42.	56	42407	15	23986	66364
2.10.42.	587	42994	7	23993	66887
3.10.42.	960	43854	524	24522	68368
4.10.42.	81	43935	40	24922	68899
5.10.42.	73	44008	49	24971	68679

APPENDIX "D".

CONSOLIDATED TOTALS.

<u>DATE.</u>	<u>ARRIVALS.</u>	<u>RUNNING TOTAL.</u>	<u>DEPARTURES.</u>	<u>RUNNING TOTAL.</u>	<u>AWAITING DISPATCH.</u>
10.8.42.	4659	4659	-	-	4659
11.8.42.	3428	8077	-	-	8077
12.8.42.	7742	15835	49	49	15786
13.8.42.	-	15835	1360	1409	14424
14.8.42.	7942	23777	1229	2638	21199
15.8.42.	-	23777	1239	3877	19900
16.8.42.	-	23777	1263	5140	18637
17.8.42.	4473	28250	1173	6313	21937
18.8.42.	6454	34704	2096	8409	26295
19.8.42.	4474	39178	1460	9869	29309
20.8.42.	4385	43563	1423	11292	32271
21.8.42.	-	43563	1388	12680	30913
22.8.42.	4545	48108	204	12882	36226
23.8.42.	522	48630	2351	15233	33877
24.8.42.	--	48630	1389	16622	32008
25.8.42.	6524	55154	1516	18138	37016
26.8.42.	2396	57550	1660	19798	37752
27.8.42.	1392	58942	1411	21209	37733
28.8.42.	--	58942	1306	22515	36427
29.8.42.	--	58942	1219	23744	35198
30.8.42.	6927	65869	1659	25403	40466
31.8.42.	--	65869	1527	26930	38937
1.9.42.	3326	69195	1888	28818	40377
2.9.42.	52	69247	3590	32308	36887
3.9.42.			1590	33898	35307
4.9.42.			1671	35569	33636
5.9.42.			1575	37135	32060
6.9.42.			1832	38967	30228
7.9.42.			1450	40417	28779
8.9.42.			953	41380	27815
9.9.42.			1389	42769	26426
10.9.42.			1676	44445	24750
11.9.42.			2421	46866	20042
12.9.42.			2043	51196	17909
13.9.42.			548	51744	17451
14.9.42.			1108	52852	16243
15.9.42.			472	53324	15771
16.9.42.			2125	55449	13646
17.9.42.			1050	56499	12596
18.9.42.			975	57474	11621
19.9.42.			954	58428	10667
20.9.42.			865	59293	9802
21.9.42.			1332	60725	8470
22.9.42.			1192	61917	7278
23.9.42.			1112	63029	6166
24.9.42.			71	63100	6095
25.9.42.			198	63298	5897
26.9.42.			193	63491	5704
27.9.42.			216	63707	5488
28.9.42.			-	63707	5488
29.9.42.			-	63707	5488
30.9.42.			1182	64889	4236
1.10.42.			962	65851	3274
2.10.42.			358	66209	2916
3.10.42.			644	66853	2272
4.10.42.			357	67210	1915
5.10.42.			83	67293	1832
6.10.42.			75	67368	1757
7.10.42.			208	67576	1549
8.10.42.			112	67688	1437
9.10.42.			90	67778	1347
10.10.42.			74	67852	1273
11.10.42.			397	68249	880
12.10.42.			1	68250	879
13.10.42.			191	68441	688
14.10.42.			120	68561	568

APPENDIX "D" (Continued.)

The difference between the number of arrivals, 69247, and the number of departures, 68679, is due to the fact that there were 568 deaths in Pahlevi during the evacuation.

APPENDIX "E"

31 MOBILE BATH UNIT BATHING FIGURES.

Date.	Camps 1 and 2	Camps 3 and 4.	
11.8.42.	200	181	
12.8.42.	703	1144	
13.8.42.	641	1275	
14.8.42.	1551	2961	
15.8.42.	1574	2781	
16.8.42.	140	1973	
17.8.42.	14	2147	
18.8.42.	427	1880	
19.8.42.	1525	3285	
20.8.42.	1479	2001	
21.8.42.	1153	2045	
22.8.42.	967	--	
23.8.42.	--	--	
24.8.42.	994	--	
25.8.42.	--	--	
26.8.42.	1226	3240	
27.8.42.	276	1408	
28.9.42.	789	2351	
29.8.42.	53	3054	
30.8.42.	--	--	
31.8.42.	1620	1978	
1.9.42.	698	1296	
2.9.42.	772	2345	
3.9.42.	473	--	
4.9.42.	570	--	
5.9.42.	948	--	
10.9.42.	707	--	
11.9.42.	1001	197	
12.9.42.	704	532	
14.9.42.	544	36	
15.9.42.	608	30	
17.9.42.	313	755	
18.9.42.	375	594	
19.9.42.	367	494	
21.9.42.	420	--	
22.9.42.	374	77	
23.9.42.	475	--	
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TOTAL*	24,512	44,556	Combined Total: 69,078
17.9.42 to 21.9.42:-		710	Convalescent and Hospital, Polish, 5 days not including 20.9.42.
2.10.42 to 12.10.42:-		1161	Convalescent and Hospital, Polish, 7 days not including 8,9,10 and 11.10.42.
Total:		1871	
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			Total bathed for all Camps:
			70,949